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This document reviews the literature on the relationship between ﬁnancial markets and the real
economy. In the light of the recent ﬁnancial crises, we focus on channels that are likely to be
important in times of ﬁnancial stress. Some of them are governed by balance sheet effects as the
ﬁnancial accelerator and the bank lending channel. We discuss the signiﬁcance of these channels
in the light of empirical evidence and try to extract their quantitative importance from the
literature. Both channels seem to have played an important role in the aftermath of the
crisis.Further, we discuss the role of trade ﬁnance in the collapse in world trade following the
ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009. While ﬁnance is important for trade, the literature is not conclusive
whether ﬁnance was also the reason for the observed collapse. Naturally, risk is important during
a ﬁnancial crisis. Taking a look at risk channels, we ﬁnd risk also to play an important role in
feedback loops between ﬁnance and the real economy. The theoretical and empirical evidence
found in the literature appears to be useful in explaining the severe and long lasting effects of the
recent ﬁnancial crisis.
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Abstract in Dutch
Dit document biedt een overzicht van de literatuur over de interactie tussen de ﬁnanciële
markten en de reële economie. Wij richten ons op transmissiekanalen die van belang zijn in het
licht van de ﬁnanciële crisis. Belangrijke kanalen, die samenhangen met de balansen van banken
en bedrijven zijn de ﬁnanciële accelerator en het ‘bank lending channel.’ Wij bespreken het
belang van deze kanalen in het licht van de bestaande empirische kennis en we proberen het
kwantitatieve belang van deze kanalen te destilleren uit de literatuur. Het blijkt dat beide kanalen
een belangrijke rol hebben gespeeld in de nasleep van de ﬁnanciële crisis. Hiernaast bespreken
we de rol van handelskredieten bij de ineenstorting van de wereldhandel in 2008-2009 als gevolg
van de crisis. Het blijkt dat weliswaar handelskredieten belangrijk zijn voor de internationale
handel, maar dat het nog niet mogelijk is duidelijke conclusies te trekken over de rol die deze
kredieten hebben gespeeld bij de teruggang van de wereldhandel. Rendementsrisico’s nemen
sterk toe aan het begin van een ﬁnanciële crisis. We bespreken de kanalen waarlangs deze
risico’s de reële economie beïnvloeden. Het blijkt dat er zowel theoretische als empirische
argumenten zijn waarom de toegenomen rendementsrisico’s het herstel vertragen.
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6Preface
In 2009 CPB addressed the consequences of the ﬁnancial crisis for the economy in the book ‘De
Grote Recessie’. This book was intended for a broad readership applying the state of the art in
economics in an accessible way to show how a shock on the U.S. housing market affected
ﬁnancial markets and the real economy around the globe. Now, one year later, the scientiﬁc
community has learned from this crisis and gained further insights. We therefore want to address
the question of the linkages between the economy’s ﬁnancial and real sector via a thorough
survey of the scientiﬁc literature. We review what economists know about this relationship and
focus in particular on mechanisms translating ﬁnancial markets’ shocks into real economic
effects that are important in times of ﬁnancial stress. In this document, we identify the key
mechanisms, explain their theoretical concepts and discuss the empirical evidence. Whenever
possible we try ﬁnd quantitative estimates of the effects and we assess how the results might be
used on the macro economic level to improve our analytical understanding of the economy.
The authors would like to thank the following people for valuable comments and
suggestions: Michiel Bijlsma (CPB), Adam Elbourne (CPB), George Gelauff (CPB), Gabriele
Galati (DNB), Ruud Okker (CPB), Bert Smid (CPB), Job Swank (DNB), Johan Verbruggen




This document gives an overview of the now vast literature that deals with the relationship
between ﬁnancial markets and the real economy. Besides the traditional view, the literature has
developed various new models that were proposed in order to get a better understanding of this
interconnection. As this overview is written in response to the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis
2007–2009, we put emphasis on economic mechanisms that are likely to be important in times
of ﬁnancial stress.
In a world with perfectly functioning capital markets we would rarely observe what has
happened after 2007. GDP, employment and trade shrunk tremendously. This is true for major
economies, the world in total and of course the Netherlands. We document the main reactions of
the economy in response to the crisis in Chapter 1. However, ﬁnancial markets do not function
perfectly, indeed there are many market failures which might have led to what we observed. The
economic literature took account of these failures and developed models that try to assess their
importance for the economy. The way by which the economy is affected is termed the
transmission channel. In Chapter 2 we introduce the channels which we investigate in this
document: i. the ﬁnancial accelerator, ii. the bank lending channel as well as iii. the risk channel
and relate them to underlying market failures. We also stress the role of these channels for world
trade.
Balance sheet effects stand at the core of two important mechanisms, the ﬁnancial accelerator
and the bank lending channel. This is because many ﬁnancial decisions are simply based on
balance sheet composition. The ﬁnancial accelerator is concerned with the balance sheet of the
borrower. The balance sheet reﬂects the worth of the borrower and an investor potentially bases
her or his decision on it. This decision then inﬂuences the economic possibilities of the borrower
in the future, e.g. through investments in housing, real estate or machinery. These decisions then
form the balance sheet in the future. In short, a dynamic process emerges giving rise to positive
and negative feedback loops. We ﬁnd that the literature supports this theoretical idea. Given the
empirical evidence in the literature, we can conclude that this mechanism is economically
important and for certain aspects a quantiﬁcation of the effect is possible. We also assess the
potential for this mechanism to be implemented in CPB’s macro economic models.
Not only the balance sheet of the borrower is important, but also the balance of the lender,
e.g. a bank or other ﬁnancial institution. It appears that bank balance sheet composition may
affect bank lending activity. This can be due to either a duration mismatch effect, whereby banks
experience a shortage of liquid assets, or to a capitalization effect, where bank capital falls short
of bank liabilities in view of the return risk on bank assets. Monetary policy primarily affects
bank liquidity. Empirical evidence based on changes in monetary policy shows that changes in
bank liquidity do not have a large independent effect on real activity. Most of the effect of
changes in liquidity supply on economic growth runs via the associated changes in interest rates.
9Bank capitalization has a strong effect on bank lending and bank loan margins. As
economy-wide shocks to bank capital are rare, the empirical evidence of the effects of bank
capitalization on economic activity is mostly based on DSGE models. Results suggest that an
economy-wide shock to bank capital has a substantial and long-lasting negative effect on
economic growth.
International trade reacted extremely strong on the ﬁnancial crisis. For a small open
economy like the Netherlands, this effect is very important. Looking at the literature on the
potential causes for this drop in trade, a mixed picture emerges. Finance plays an important role
in trade and comes in many facets, i.e. letters of credit, factoring, lending and trade insurances to
name the most important. Some studies come to the conclusion that ﬁnance was a considerable
problem in the aftermath of the crisis, others conclude that the reasons were different. Demand
effects concentrated on goods that are heavily traded, such as equipment, might also be
important. Recent evidence points into the direction that trade insurances play a major role in
times of ﬁnancial stress. However, also the above balance sheet effects might be important.
Given the results in the literature, we are not able to precisely judge the signiﬁcance of ﬁnance
for trade nor are we able to quantify its impact on a macro economic level. We think that further
research has to be done here, especially given the importance of trade for the Netherlands.
In times of crisis, risk is a major concern to actors on ﬁnancial markets. Financial crises
boost investment return risk and risk premia. Households and ﬁrms alike react to an increase in
uncertainty by postponing expenditures. This creates a positive feedback loop that intensiﬁes the
downturn. The macroeconomic effects of a ﬁnancial crisis therefore depend in part on the
strength of the precautionary saving motive on the part of households and ﬁrms, and on the
option value of investment on the part of ﬁrms. Existing empirical research indicates that both
types of effects may be substantial. However, to take account of them considerable further
empirical research would be necessary to quantify effects on the macro economic level.
We conclude the document by noting that the dynamic structure of the ﬁnancial accelerator
and the bank lending channel provide theoretically and empirically valuable insights. These
insights are in accordance with empirical observations on the economic impact of the crisis and
the long period of recovery. Feedback loops implied by the risk channel work in general in the
same direction. Furthermore, we asses and discuss possible directions for future research and
implementation possibilities regarding the above mechanisms in macro economic modelling
strategies.
101 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis that started in 2007 in the U.S. subprime market spread to the real side of the
global economy in the second half of 2008. By early 2009, world production was down by 1%,
and world trade by 13%. In comparison with ‘normal’ international business cycle ﬂuctuations,
this drop in real activity is both large and strongly synchronized. The natural question to ask is
then what is so special about ﬁnancial crises that causes these large disruptions in economic
activity? In this paper, we survey the literature dealing with the transmission channels from the
ﬁnancial to the real sector of the economy in an attempt to ﬁnd part of an answer to this question.
Figure 1.1 Gross domestic product (GDP)
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Left panel: OECD.Stat quarterly national accounts. Quarterly growth rate of real GDP, seasonally adjusted.
Right panel: Real GDP level index computed from growth rates left panel.
From the literature,1 a number of general characteristics emerge. First, economic slowdowns and
recessions following a period of ﬁnancial stress are more severe than normal ones and last
longer, with a cumulative deﬁcit in GDP till recovery of about 4½% as against 2%.
In addition, the recovery after a recession is often not complete, leading to a permanent
output loss, compared to the original trend growth path. However, only about 50% of all
episodes of ﬁnancial stress are followed by a downturn. The risk of a downturn is larger after a
banking crisis (as opposed to a currency crisis), following strong liquidity growth and in the
presence of substantial debt in the private sector.
The response of key economic variables in the wake of a ﬁnancial crisis differs. GDP growth
start to recover after about two years, but unemployment stays above normal for about four
years. Asset prices (common stock, house prices) show a peak-to-trough length of about 3½
years. Investment falls a lot more in response to a ﬁnancial crisis than in other recessions, and
1 See e.g. Cerra and Saxena (2008); Reinhart and Rogoff (2008); IMF (2008); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); Van Ewijk and
Teulings (2009); Allen et al. (2009); Laeven and Valencia (2010)
11consumption growth also slows down more substantially. This stronger response of real
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Left panel: OECD.Stat. Civilian employment including self employed. Quarterly growth rate of employment , seasonally adjusted.
Right panel: Employment level index computed from growth rates left panel.
To set the stage for this paper, it is interesting to take stock of the development of worldwide
economic activity in the aftermath of the crisis of 2007/08, in an attempt to see whether the
current crisis conforms to the characteristics of ﬁnancial crises in general. The ﬁnancial crisis
started to have a serious impact on economic activity by mid 2008.
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Left panel: CPB World trade merchandise goods volume index (2000=100).
Right panel: U.S.: Standard & Poor’s/Case-Shiller Home Price Index U.S. national values. EU: European Central Bank, Euro-area (16
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existing dwellings.
The left panel in Figure 1.1 shows that on average the recession lasted ﬁve quarters, from Q2
2008 till Q2 2009. The impact on the level of GDP is obviously longer lasting as can be seen
from the right panel in Figure 1.1. World trade started to fall a bit later than production, but the
12decline was much steeper (left panel Figure 1.3). Still, the volume of world trade is (almost)
back to the level before the start of the crisis, whereas the level of production is still substantially
below pre-crisis levels in most countries surveyed here. The development of employment over
the crisis is different yet again. The left panel in Figure 1.2 shows that employment started to
decline one quarter later than production, in Q2 2008, but then stays negative at least until Q1
2010, about four quarter after the end of the recession. The impact on the level of employment is
as in case of GDP longer lasting which can be seen in the right panel of Figure 1.2. What is
striking here is that The Netherlands have not been hit as strong as other countries.
Both the size of the initial shock and the subsequent recovery appear to agree reasonably
well with the stylised facts outlined above. The recession ended after about a year, a duration
twice as long as a normal recession for the U.S., but nothing out of the ordinary for the EU (Artis
et al., 2004). Employment is still going down in Q1 of 2010, but may reach its trough by the end
of 2010, which would indeed match the average length of 3½years. Housing price decline in the
U.S. appears to have stabilized, but housing prices in the EU are still under pressure (right panel
in Figure 1.3). A special feature of the current crisis is the large fall in world trade, an issue that
we shall come back to in Chapter 5 below.
13142 Transmission Channels
In a world of perfect and complete ﬁnancial markets, the channels through which ﬁnancial
shocks affect the real economy are interest rates and exchange rates, i.e. price channels.
However, in such a (semi-) perfect world banks have no independent role and banking crises do
not occur. In a ﬁnancial crisis, non-price mechanisms play an important role. In the next few
chapters, we review the theoretical structure of and empirical evidence on a number of non-price
transmission channels of ﬁnancial shocks.2
Financial transmission channels have been a subject of intense research at least since the
Great Depression. According to Fisher (1933), the severity of the Great Depression was in large
part caused by excessive leverage before the crash and deﬂation afterwards. The causal chain of
events listed by Fisher contains many items that also appear in the current discussion, e.g. ﬁre
sales, bank runs, credit rationing, and precautionary saving.
Keynes (1936) took a different line to the analysis of the Great Depression by focusing on the
money supply, rather than on credit channels, and the state of investor conﬁdence. This view was
elaborated on in Friedman and Schwartz (1963), who argued that the money supply had been a
key determinant of output during the Great Depression. Monetary contraction led to deﬂation
and high real interest rates at the same time when effective demand was low due to a lack of
investor conﬁdence.
The monetarist view of Friedman and others concentrates on the supply of money or, more
generally, loanable funds. It holds that for the transmission of ﬁnancial shocks, bank portfolio
composition does not matter, because borrowers can easily issue bonds or commercial paper
themselves. In this view, the only net role of banks is money creation, and monetary policy only
affects the total amount of credit, or loanable funds, by means of its effect on the rate of interest.
2.1 The Monetarist Transmission Channel
It will prove useful to ﬁrst review the standard monetarist transmission channel. In any case, the
most frequent type of ﬁnancial shocks are monetary policy shocks, and most empirical
information about ﬁnancial transmission channels is based on the effects of changes in monetary
policy. Figure 2.13 displays a ﬂow diagram of the main transmission channels of monetary
policy.
An open market operation by the central bank, e.g. monetary tightening by selling
government securities, affects the reserves of the banking sector and the money supply. As banks
have less liquidity, they may reduce bank loans (the bank lending channel). To induce the private
2 Gertler (1988) surveys the literature up to 1987, Walsh (2003) and Freixas and Rochet (2008) offer a discussion of
recent research.
3 After Kuttner and Mosser (2002)
15Figure 2.1 Monetary policy transmission channels
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sector to hold the extra securities, interest rates rise.4 This sets in motion the interest rate
channel.5 Private agents invest less since the opportunity costs for the invested capital increase.
This applies ﬁrst and foremost to ﬁrms that might lower investments into e.g. production
facilities, which lowers their future output. However, consumer spending is affected too, notably
regarding consumer durables and housing. The fall in private sector spending then boosts the
saving rate, which acts as a stabilizing feedback towards further interest rate increases. In
principle, shocks that affect long term real interest rates should have a larger impact, as these
rates are the most relevant ones for large and long-lasting decisions. The real effects of such a
ﬁnancial shock are a reduction in current and future output and a lower demand for consumer
durables.
Exchange rates constitute an important supplementary price channel of monetary
transmission. A rise in interest rates generally leads to capital inﬂows and an appreciation of the
domestic currency. As a result, net exports fall, with a similar effect on real activity as that of the
interest rate channel, as indicated in Figure 2.1. The exchange rate channel is mainly of
independent importance in currency crises, which are outside the scope of this paper (see e.g.
Sachs et al., 1996, for a survey). Other potentially important feedback loops, that are not
displayed in Figure 2.1, may arise via policy intervention, e.g. policy measures to counteract the
4 US monetary policy nowadays aims at maintaining a stable Federal Funds rate by means of open market operations, not
at a target level of money supply.
5 For a detailed overview of this channel see e.g. Taylor (1995).
16destabilizing effects of some of the transmission channels (see e.g. Cecchetti et al., 2000;
Bernanke and Gertler, 2001; Kannan et al., 2009). Policy issues are not dealt with in this paper.
The monetarist emphasis on the interest rate channel does not deny the existence of other
channels. Indeed, interest rate changes affect desired portfolio holdings and the market value of
assets, including equity. Changes in asset values act on the balance sheets of banks,
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and households. A fall in asset prices lowers the net worth of households and
ﬁrms, and reduces the value of their collateral. This activates both the ‘ﬁnancial accelerator’ and
the wealth channel, to be discussed in Chapter 3 below.6 Asset price changes also affect the net
worth of banks. Chapter 4 discusses how this affects banks’ loan supply and triggers the bank
lending channel, or more speciﬁcally, the bank capital channel. However, within the monetarist
view the ﬁnancial accelerator and the bank capital channel are really only subchannels of the
interest rate channel, triggered by interest rate movements.
2.2 Credit Channels
The monetarist view of real/ﬁnancial interaction went on virtually unchallenged for about two
decades, until Mishkin (1978) and Bernanke (1983) showed that monetary factors alone were
insufﬁcient to explain the depth and duration of the Great Depression and that ﬁnancial factors,
notably bank lending, had an independent effect in addition to the money supply.
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) identify three puzzles that the monetarist view cannot solve,
and that point to the existence of other channels:
1. Following a monetary policy shock, the real side of the economy reacts substantially, while the
size of interest rate effects is rather modest. To match these effects, interest rate elasticities for
saving and investment should be much larger than what is empirically plausible.
2. The timing of the response paths of variables following a monetary policy shock shows that
some real variables only start to move when interest rates are back to base value. This suggest
the presence of substantial non-price effects.
3. The composition of the real expenditure response is also at odds with a purely monetarist
interpretation. A policy shock mainly affects short-term rates, while on the expenditure side the
main response is from real estate investment.
Bernanke and Gertler argue that these puzzles provide evidence for the existence of a credit
channel of monetary policy besides the interest rate channel, to be subdivided into a bank
lending channel and a ﬁnancial accelerator (balance sheet channel in their terminology).
6 Business cycle ﬂuctuations are a common trigger of the ﬁnancial accelerator: at the start of a recession asset prices fall,
ﬁrm net worth drops and bank credit is curtailed.
17The puzzles of Bernanke and Gertler indicate that the interest rate channel cannot provide the
full story, but they do not deny the importance of the interest rate transmission channel. In fact,
the monetarist view could remain dominant for so long because the interest rate channel is in any
case a prominent channel of ﬁnancial transmission, even if the presence of other channels can be
demonstrated. In an extensive empirical study covering most EU countries, Angeloni et al.
(2002) ﬁnd that neither the Interest Rate Channel (IRC), nor a broader ﬁnancial transmission
channel appears to be dominant. However, the IRC is prominent throughout the EU, and is
dominant in a subset of countries. Van Aarle et al. (2003) also ﬁnd substantial diversity in the
effects of monetary policy between EU countries.7
2.3 The Transmission of Asset Market Shocks
In a ﬁnancial crisis, the relevant shocks are not open market operations, but (large) changes in
asset prices. These shocks act directly on the balance sheet of private agents, bypassing the
interest rate channel. In comparison with the effect of open market operations, asset price
changes in a crisis are much larger. The annual standard deviation of stock market prices is
about 15% (Campbell, 2003) and an economic crisis on average implies a fall in asset prices of
30% (Barro and Ursúa, 2008). In contrast, a typical policy intervention by the Central Bank
changes interest rates by about 25 basis points and, if unexpected, causes a stock price change of
1.2%–1.7% (Rigobon and Sack, 2004; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). Still, the main wealth
effect of monetary policy is via equity prices, not bond prices (Craine and Martin, 2003).
Compared to ﬁnancial crises, monetary policy has only a second-order effect on asset prices
and private agent’s portfolios.8 Hence, the relative importance of the interest rate channel and
the credit channels changes substantially in a ﬁnancial crisis. The types of shocks that we are
concerned with in this paper primarily act through the balance sheets of agents, viz. the ﬁnancial
accelerator via the balance sheet of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and households and the bank capital
channel via the balance sheet of commercial banks. These channels are displayed in the lower
left half of Figure 2.1. We shall also discuss the effects of relative asset price changes, notably
risk premia, which are represented by the monetarist channel in the lower right of Figure 2.1.
7 A related issue is whether the relative importance of different transmission channels has shifted over time. For the U.S.,
there is evidence that the effect of monetary policy shocks has declined in the last two decades (Kuttner and Mosser,
2002; Boivin and Giannoni, 2006; Boivin et al., 2010). Kuttner and Mosser distinguish three main reasons why monetary
policy transmission channels may have changed, ﬁnancial innovations (e.g. securitization), changes in monetary policy
conduct, and structural changes in the non-ﬁnancial sectors. Boivin et al. (2010) conclude that changes in the monetary
transmission mechanism were mainly due to changes in policy rules and related changes in expectations of the private
sector.
8 Mishkin (2001) gives an overview of the effect of monetary policy via asset prices other than interest rates.
182.4 An Outline of the Document
In the next two chapters we discuss the credit view of ﬁnancial transmission. This view focuses
on the role played by ﬁnancial assets and liabilities in the transmission of ﬁnancial shocks. It
expresses the idea that it is not just the total amount of loanable funds that matters for the supply
of credit, but also the balance sheet composition of the agents involved. In this view, balance
sheet composition matters because there is asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders, which creates a market incompleteness that is partly resolved through quantity
adjustments. Knowledge of market prices alone is not sufﬁcient to determine allocations. We
distinguish between balance sheet effects for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and households, which are
discussed in Chapter 3, and balance sheet effects for banks in Chapter 4. Bank lending is also
important to ﬁnance trade. In Chapter 5 we discuss the speciﬁcs of trade ﬁnance and the possible
role of a credit channel in the collapse of world trade in the fall of 2008.
Not all effects of a ﬁnancial crisis operate through the balance sheet of private agents,
however. Chapter 6 discusses how a ﬁnancial crisis affects expected asset return risk. This
affects relative asset prices and interest rates, and activates the monetarist channel.
Table 2.1 gives a summary view of the relation between various market failures and the
transmission channels to be discussed below.
Table 2.1 Market failures and ﬁnance
Type Chapter
Moral hazard (borrowers), (partly) non-enforceable contracts,
imperfect information
Financial accelerator (Chapter 3)
Moral hazard (lenders), monitoring, ﬁnancial intermediation,
customer markets
Bank lending (Chapter 4)
Moral hazard (borrowers), (partly) non-enforceable contracts,
imperfect information, adverse selection, incomplete markets
Trade and ﬁnance (Chapter 5)
Volatility as a risk factor, incomplete markets, risk panics, pre-
cautionary behaviour
Risk channels (Chapter 6)
19203 The Financial Accelerator
Since the ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009, the ﬁnancial accelerator has gained increasing attention in
the literature. Its basic mechanism builds on two inﬂuential contributions. First, there is the
widely cited paper by Bernanke et al. (1996) which provided the term ‘ﬁnancial accelerator’, and
second and equally important, the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) which develops the
mechanism within a more complete model environment. Basically, both contributions stress the
effects of credit constraints and credit collateral for the real economy propagated through an
ampliﬁcation mechanism in the sense of a feedback loop9.
As the term ‘accelerator’ already suggests, the mechanism at work aims at explaining large
effects that are caused by maybe minor shocks or events. The term ‘ﬁnancial’ has been set in
front of it since we are concerned with the balance sheet of investors. This has been emphasized
by Bernanke (2007): ‘[t]his ‘ﬁnancial accelerator’ effect applies in principle to any shock that
affects borrower balance sheets or cash ﬂows.’ Thus, it is a mechanism that ampliﬁes shocks
through taking account of a borrower’s ﬁnancial situation determined by accounting and book
keeping rules.
This chapter will ﬁrst look at the theory behind the ﬁnancial accelerator to provide its
economic intuition. As we will see, the theory provides us with rather straightforward results.
However, even though theory might be suggestive, it is only useful if the effects expected are
economically signiﬁcant and observable. The second section therefore looks at the available
empirical evidence and at macroeconomic models that are guided empirically, i.e. DSGE models,
and their success in explaining economic development. Finally, we discuss the ﬁndings and try
to draw conclusions from the reviewed literature with respect to CPB macro economic models.
3.1 Theoretical Arguments
The key theoretical contributions that gave rise to the literature on the ﬁnancial accelerator are
brieﬂy summarized in Bijlsma et al. (2010). However, at this point we would like to go a bit
deeper into the details of the mechanism and elaborate more on its functioning. The necessary
and most important ingredient for the mechanism of the ﬁnancial accelerator to work is the
prevalence of credit constraints tied to some underlying collateral asset’s value. This is
equivalent to a speciﬁc type of ﬁnancial market imperfection. These are predominantly moral
hazard on the side of the borrower, imperfect information on the side of the lender as well as non
perfectly enforceable and incomplete credit contracts. The constraints can be strong or soft,
depending on the assumptions that seem to be most appropriate in the particular setting. Strong
9 It seems that also Fazzari et al. (1988) have suggested a comparable link between ﬁnancial markets and the real
economy but not within a fully formulated model.
21credit constraints apply e.g. to a situation where lenders are only willing to provide credit against
full collateralization, soft constraints might apply in a setting where credit is feasible beyond
collateral but only against higher credit cost. Soft credit constraints might also be termed credit
frictions. If there were no need for constraints or credit frictions, the mechanism would simply
not apply and one would, of course, obtain a result in accordance with the well known
Modigliani-Miller theorem stating that the real economy is not affected by the structure of
ﬁnance. This means that the aforementioned market imperfections were not to exist and we were
in principle back at a perfectly efﬁcient Arrow and Debreu (1954) economy. There would be no
need for collateral and the prerequisite of the ﬁnancial accelerator would cease to exist.
In fact, this is what makes this channel distinct from the normal and standard interest rate
channel which does not work via the structure of ﬁnance. It demands some form of market
failure or market incompleteness. Arguments that are used in the literature to motivate this are
e.g. principal-agent relationships in credit markets, where the lender (principal) can not perfectly
enforce its rights against the borrower (agent) and has therefore to constrain the agent. Another
example would be the case of information asymmetries where the borrower has no incentive to
provide the lender with the full set of information. In such an environment there is a need for the
lender to collateralize his lending with some assets owned by the borrower to provide sufﬁcient
incentives to the borrower to meet his obligations. This can have important dynamic effects
which lead to ampliﬁcations.
The ampliﬁcation effect comes into play by the following consideration. Consider that the
collateral, a ﬁrm has to offer in order to obtain a credit for an investment, is in some way tied to
the economic net worth of this investment. An example would be a new plant which is necessary
for a ﬁrm to expand its business. If its value is hit by a shock, be it negative of positive by nature,
the collateral’s value changes and so does the volume of obtainable credit. The volume of credit
then affects the economic activity of the ﬁrm e.g. as it inﬂuences investment possibilities as the
size of the new plant in our example. This already causes a real effect. So far, this is only a direct
effect of the credit constraint or friction. An ampliﬁcation or accelerator effect sets in as soon as
the economic activity of the borrower affects its net worth available as collateral. In our example
this could be the case if the ﬁrm’s total value declines if it is not able to build the new plant in the
desired way. It would have to compromise on that new plant and might loose competitiveness. If
this is to happen, the direct effect causes another revaluation of the collateral and a spiral
mechanism emerges which might well be stronger than the direct effect of the mentioned shock.
The ampliﬁcation sets in because of the double role of the borrower’s or ﬁrm’s net worth. First,
it is a collateral, and second, it is to some extent related to the borrower’s real economic activity
as in this case production in the new plant. Another quite good example for such a collateral is
land which is a common used collateral value and is also in use as a factor of production. During
e.g. a devaluation process both the land’s value and the user’s cost for land fall; the latter do
simply reﬂect the opportunity cost of land holding. It should be noted that this mechanism does
22not only affect bank lending but also all other forms of lending e.g. also external ﬁnance of ﬁrms
directly over the capital market in case of commercial papers. Thus, the mechanism does not
rely on the existence of a banking sector. The mechanism is visualized in Figure 3.1 which is
taken from Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In Appendix 8 at the end of this document we provide
the basic mechanism of the ﬁnancial accelerator through a simple model which is taken from
Bernanke et al. (1996) based on the more elaborate model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
Figure 3.1 Financial accelerator
t t+1 t+2
Negative temporary shock
Net worth of constraint
firms falls
Asset demand of constrained
firms falls
User cost of asset falls
Asset price falls
Net worth of constraint
firms falls
Asset demand of constrained
firms falls
User cost of asset falls
Net worth of constraint
firms falls
Asset demand of constrained
firms falls
User cost of asset falls
…
Figure following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
Building on these basic insights, a literature has developed which looks at the basic mechanism
from different perspectives. Krishnamurthy (2010) gives an overview over the different classes
of models developed in the literature. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Vayanos (2004)
analyse the effects of volatility shocks through this channel while He and Krishnamurthy
(2008b) interpret a shock as an initial withdrawal of investor’s equity. The interrelation between
credit networks and the ﬁnancial accelerator is modelled in Gatti et al. (2010). The basic
mechanism in all of these models is identical, what varies is just the economic interpretation of
the shock in the beginning of the acceleration.
The mechanism has found its way also into more elaborate models employing it as one
aspect of the economy. In a series of papers, Aghion et al. (2001, 2004a,b) build theoretical
models in which they try to explain currency crises through, among other things, balance sheet
effects in the spirit of the ﬁnancial accelerator. Also proceeding in this direction, Schneider and
Tornell (2004) build a model of credit constraints and systemic bailout guarantees and show how
currency and credit crises develop endogenously. Tornell and Westermann (2002) build a related
23model focusing on middle-income countries during the ﬁnancial crises in Asia and Mexico in
1990s.
Cooley and Quadrini (2006) employ a ﬁnancial accelerator type mechanism in a
heterogeneous ﬁrm model. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to size and equity with smaller
ﬁrms more averse to high leverage. The authors ﬁnd, not surprisingly, that ﬁnancial shocks hit
small ﬁrms harder and that a large number of small ﬁrms prolongs the output effect of monetary
shocks through their investment decisions. The role of heterogeneous investment projects is
analysed in Matsuyama (2007). The author shows that a corresponding extension of the
Bernanke et al. (1996) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) models can give rise to a large number of
effects in the credit market. Among them are credit cycles, credit collapses, traps and
discontinuities. The reason for this is heterogeneity in productivity. Capital market shocks
inﬂuencing credit possibilities thereby determine which productivities are able to reﬁnance at the
capital market. Due to this, capital market shocks inﬂuence technology through a selection
process. This induces quite complex non-linearities with rather different outcomes.
Contagion is an important phenomenon in many ﬁnancial crises. Essentially, contagion of a
crisis means that a shock initially affecting a single ﬁrm, sector or economy later on spreads out
to other ﬁrms, sectors or economies. The ﬁnancial accelerator has found its way into this
literature providing a theoretical appealing argument. The effect of a shock might spread to other
ﬁrms, sectors or economies through collateral externalities. Theoretical work in this direction
can be found in Kyle and Xiong (2001), Paasche (2001), Boissay (2006) and Fostel and
Geanakoplos (2008), empirically Imbs (2010) ﬁnds some evidence for asset correlations during
the crisis of 2007. The intuition behind this spill-over effect is simply that one borrower might
suffer a negative shock; subsequently, the insetting devaluation of the collateral due to the
accelerator mechanism carries over to another borrower because both use the same asset class as
collateral.
Some authors have taken a deeper look at the speciﬁc role of the credit constraints in
ampliﬁcation mechanisms as the ﬁnancial accelerator. This line of research goes a step further
than the literature cited so far as they assess the role of credit constraints ex ante rather than ex
post. In an ex post analysis, the credit constraints are simply exogenous rules which limit the
possibilities of borrowing for an agent such as a ﬁrm or an economy. Ex ante, however, credit
constraints are not exogenous but have to be endogenously explained in a model, i.e. have to be
negotiated between the lender and the borrower. Lorenzoni (2008) points to an interesting
dynamic source of inefﬁciencies if credit constraints are endogenous. If ﬁrms have a certain
degree of freedom in offering collateral for obtaining ﬁnance, they might do this in an inefﬁcient
way. They tend to offer too much collateral in advance of a negative shock. After the accelerator
mechanism has set in, they are even more constrained afterwards due the losses in their asset’s
value. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) consider a
24similar problem in an open economy setting. It is the problem of foreign currency denominated
debt which is best applicable to less developed countries that is analysed here. Borrowers have
the choice to obtain credit in the domestic or a foreign currency. However, negative shocks may
lead to a devaluation of the domestic currency letting foreign denominated debt appreciate
accordingly. The collateral they have to offer is the liquidation value of their ﬁrms. In case of
foreign denominated debt, a domestic currency depreciation effectively increases the risk or
extent of liquidation. As such the choice of foreign denominated debt results in an over supply
of collateral in expected value and an endogenous choice of credit constraints. This replicates
the result in Lorenzoni (2008) obtained for a closed economy. Following this argument, it is
rather not surprising that Elekda˘ g and Tchakarov (2007) ﬁnd in a similar setting welfare
improving effects for exchange rate stabilizing policies in the presence of a ﬁnancial accelerating
mechanism.
The ﬁnancial accelerator introduced by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1996)
focuses on investment which is subject to constraints due to collateralization. However, some
authors focus also on consumption. Before turning to the literature, we have to be aware that
there is a fundamental difference between ﬁrms’ investments and consumers’ expenditures. The
standard neoclassical ﬁrm would not constrain its investments through some natural limit if
markets were to function perfectly. This is different with consumers. Consumers facing an
intertemporal utility maximization problem have a budget constraint which sets a limit to their
consumption expenditure. Consumers, if they act rationally, will voluntarily constrain
themselves regarding their choice for consumption. Ludvigson (1999), Iacoviello (2004, 2005),
Aoki et al. (2004) and also Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) follow this reasoning and make use of
a life-cycle household consumption model. Not surprisingly, wealth is the important determinant
of consumption and is inﬂuenced by asset values. This makes consumption subject to the
accelerator mechanism. The just mentioned studies focus on house prices as the relevant
collateral asset since housing is considered the most important investment by households. The
result typically found in the literature is that high current house prices raise consumption while
high (expected) future prices dampen it. The last effect is due to higher opportunity costs of
current consumption. Investing in property would lead to higher returns in terms of household
utility than contemporaneous consumption. This establishes a direct link between the ﬁnancial
accelerator and consumption. If house prices fall, ceteris paribus, today, consumption declines
today but is to rise steeper in the future. This is only in accordance with consumption theory if
the interest rate increase in the future which again negatively effect future house prices.
Additionally, as is mentioned by some authors, credit constraints might also be important if
wealth is represented by future income ﬂows against which an individual might borrow in a
constrained way in order to consume today.
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relevance and the justiﬁcation for this ampliﬁcation mechanism. Krishnamurthy (2003) shows
that hedging strategies, e.g. through appropriate insurances or contingent credit contracts, can
render the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism to loose its effects. However, on the aggregate level
of the economy hedging counter parties might as well be constrained, which results in a shift of
the accelerator mechanism from borrowers to e.g. insurances with almost identical effects as
before. Bacchetta and Caminal (2000) build a deterministic general equilibrium model with
credit constraints similar to the ideas in Bernanke et al. (1996). Their results show that
acceleration or ampliﬁcation only holds for unanticipated shocks. Cordoba and Ripoll (2004)
criticize the theoretical literature on their tendency to allow for extreme modelling assumptions,
i.e. linear preferences, that are the driving forces behind the ampliﬁcation mechanism. In
particular they construct a general equilibrium model along the lines in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Bernanke et al. (1996) but with more standard assumptions on e.g. the utility
function. With more realistic assumptions they ﬁnd in simulations of their model that the
ampliﬁcation effect becomes much smaller. This critique, however, applies only to the rather
stylised and partial models discussed so far. Below, we also review the literature that uses the
ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism in DSGE models which are robust with respect to this argument.
To sum up, the theoretical argument underlying the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is
appealing. It provides convincing intuition and a large literature with important theoretical
contributions has emerged so far. In the light of the ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009 and the
concerning literature, the mechanism has again gained the attention of many economists.
Some theoretical criticism exists, but it does not seem to be overwhelmingly strong. What
however is important, is the empirical evidence on this theory. For the ﬁnancial accelerator to be
an important mechanism shaping and inﬂuencing economic development, it needs statistically as
well as economically signiﬁcant empirical results that underpin its role for the real economy.
3.2 Empirical Observations
In this section we take up the question that concluded the last section. We try to assess from the
available literature whether the ﬁnancial accelerator has economically signiﬁcant implications
for the economy. We, ﬁrst, look at empirical and quantitative work and, second, we look at
indirect evidence of the mechanism that is obtained in modern macroeconomic DSGE models.
We regard this as indirect evidence as this literature looks at the question whether adding a
ﬁnancial accelerator to a standard DSGE models helps to improve its performance. As such this
is not a direct test of the theory but is still very useful.
263.2.1 Quantitative Studies
Conceptually, there are two questions to be answered if we are to draw inference on the
empirical relevance of the ﬁnancial accelerator. The ﬁrst is whether ﬁrms, sectors, consumers or
the total economy are indeed credit constrained. The second question, which is only important if
we can answer the ﬁrst question with a ‘yes,’ asks then whether there are empirical ﬁndings
supporting the ampliﬁcation mechanism. Following this line of argument, there is one key
variable that can be used to empirically track the economic importance of the ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism. It is the existence of the spread10 reﬂecting credit constraints. For the
second question, it is its counter-cyclical behaviour11 that fuels the accelerator effect.
It seems to be in order to elaborate a bit more on the implication of a counter-cyclical spread
of the ﬁnancial accelerator. It applies to the market for external ﬁnance and the rate of interest
charged for ﬁnancing an investment. The price for borrowing is higher than the costs to the
lender for reﬁnancing the borrower’s debt on the capital market. The spread exists because ﬁrms
are able to borrow less than they are willing to if there were no credit constraints; this is, of
course, tautological. This drives the marginal product of investments inside a ﬁrm above the
going rate of return on the capital market. Due to the credit constraints, this wedge can not be
exploited by arbitrage. Indeed the wedge between the rates of return is needed to cover the cost
associated with the credit constraint motivated by the above market failures (e.g. monitoring
cost). If the economy or a part of the economy is hit by a negative shock, this wedge increases12.
Through asset devaluation, the implied reduction in collateral value, ﬁrms are even less able to
invest or even have to disinvest. This in turn drives up the marginal product of investments and
increases the gap between the return on the capital market. The statistical test for the
counter-cyclicality of the spread lies in a test of a signiﬁcant relationship between the real
economy and the credit constraints. This is precisely what induces the ampliﬁcation mechanism
as explained above.
Credit constraints
There are at least two ways to address the question on the relevance of credit constraints given
the above theoretical arguments. One strand of the literature, predominantly from the 80s and
90s, looks at evidence for constraints from an aggregate point of view. These studies look at
sector or even economy wide data. While we think that the constraints relevant to this chapter
should be visible at this level of aggregation, we do not think that their existence is sufﬁcient for
the validity of the ﬁnancial accelerator. The theory explained above has very sophisticated micro
economic foundations. Therefore it seems necessary to search for empirical evidence on precise
10 In the literature on the ﬁnancial accelerator, the spread is often also refereed to as the ‘price-cost margin.’
11 E.g. an economic downturn should be accompanied by an increase in this spread on the ﬁnancial market.
12 This is due to the neo-classical assumption of a decreasing marginal product of capital. At lower values of the capital
stock (i.e. if the credit constraint applies) the effects of shocks are larger than at higher values.
27this level of aggregation what we will do below. We believe that this second way of addressing
the question is preferable.
Reviewing the literature up to 1998, Hubbard (1998) points to the empirical relevance of
credit constraints. The evidence cited in Hubbard (1998) is mostly micro econometric relying on
ﬁrm level data and clearly show that a substantial part of companies is indeed credit constrained.
Also, the credit constraints are economically signiﬁcant in the sense of a sizable spread. Also
Bernanke et al. (1996) give an overview over empirical work that seems to support the
signiﬁcance of credit constraints. Using data on U.S. commercial property ﬁnance contracts,
Benmelech et al. (2005) ﬁnd that collateralized properties which are less restricted in
redeployability due to public regulation lead to more favourable ﬁnance contracts for the
borrower. I.e. the borrower is able to negotiate a lower rate of interest and longer maturities
among other things if e.g. a property used as collateral can be used for many purposes.
Benmelech and Bergman (2009, 2010) ﬁnd within the U.S. airline industry that decreasing
collateral values increase the spread for external ﬁnance. Chaney et al. (2010) use U.S. ﬁrm level
data on real estate property and ﬁrm’s ability to obtain external ﬁnance. They authors ﬁnd that an
increase of the property value increases investments undertaken by the ﬁrm. There is also a
considerable literature that tries to quantify the impact of Tobin’s Q and q , i.e. the average and
marginal ratio of a ﬁrm’s market and book value, on investments decisions on the macro and
micro level. Davis (2010) summarizes this literature. In general the ﬁndings are mixed and it is
questionable whether these results can be taken as evidence against or in favour of credit
constraints. The crucial question would be whether Tobin’s Q or q is a valid proxy for
collaterizable value which might not always be the case. A discussion on this point can be found
e.g. in Hubbard (1998). At least on theoretical grounds this can well be questioned. Already in
Hayashi (1982) it has been demonstrated that the role of Tobin’s Q is theoretically caused by
adjustment costs in the investment process which are not necessary equivalent to credit
constraints or frictions. Also Chirinko (1993) discusses critically the role of Q in empirical
investment studies.
The theoretical literature cited in the preceding section points also to the role of consumption
in combination with a ﬁnancial accelerator. Therefore one could also ask the question whether
there is empirical evidence on credit constraints or comparable ﬁnancial frictions for consumers.
However, there are fundamental differences between consumption and investment as already
outlined above. While a ﬁrm might potentially invest in an unlimited fashion13, depending on its
production technology, consumers will not act so regarding consumption. This is obvious when
looking at life cycle models of consumption. Here consumers will rationally choose to limit
13 This is the well known result from neoclassical economics stating that the size of the ﬁrms is undetermined in general
equilibrium.
28consumption to an extent determined by income and wealth14. Therefore one could never
differentiate between voluntary choice or an exogenous constraint. However, a valid question
would be whether there exist constraints that go beyond what consumers voluntarily would do.
This question is important since the severity of constraints is an important determinant of the
accelerator effect. We have already seen this in the stylised model regarding investment,
presented in the Appendix of this document. A literature that could give indirect empirical
evidence on such additional and more severe constraints is dealing with the effects of ﬁnancial
liberalization on consumption patterns. The underlying idea is that ﬁnancial liberalization gives
consumers more freedom to achieve their optimum consumption plans. If there were excessive
constraints before, consumption should react to such a liberalization. Bacchetta and Gerlach
(1997) ﬁnd evidence for the relevance of additional constraints represented by aggregate credit
market conditions for 5 large economies. Using rolling regression techniques, Byrne and Davis
(2003) show for the G7 that ﬁnancial wealth has an increasing explanatory content with respect
to consumption. Interpreting this in the light of increasing ﬁnancial liberalization, this points
towards decreasing additional constraints. Barrell and Davis (2007) look at consumption patterns
in the G7 countries taking account of a ﬁnancial liberalization indicator provided by the OECD.
They too ﬁnd wealth to become more important for consumption as the indicator increases. The
studies so far focus on a sample of countries. Barrell and Davis (2007) also review the literature
that focuses on single countries where mixed evidence is to be found. The general tendency that
can be found is that the results are in favour of the role of additional constraints for the U.S., UK
and Canada but not so much for continental Europe. Using micro data, Ludvigson (1999) ﬁnds
signiﬁcant evidence for time varying credit constraints applying to U.S. consumers.
Accelerator
Probably the ﬁrst study to deal empirically with the ﬁnancial accelerator is Fazzari et al. (1988).
In this study U.S. ﬁrm level data reveal that investments are quite more sensitive to variations in
collateral for credit constrained ﬁrms than for unconstrained ones. Follow-up studies reviewed in
Bernanke et al. (1996) come to comparable results. These results can at least be seen as indirect
evidence in favour of the accelerator mechanism as it links credit constraints, activity and
collateral value.
Indirect evidence has been found by Mendoza and Terrones (2008) who document for a large
panel of countries the pro-cyclicality of credit volumes and asset prices at both the macro and the
ﬁrm level for emerging and industrialized economies. While their contribution is a more
descriptive threshold analysis, Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) employ more sophisticated panel
VAR methods using data for industrialized economies. They ﬁnd house prices to increase credit
14 Theoretically this can be understood as a mechanism that rules out capital market inconsistencies as e.g. Ponzi
schemes.
29volume and credit volume to increase both house prices and GDP. Braun and Larrain (2005) use
cross country sector data on output growth and the industry’s reliance on external ﬁnance. They
ﬁnd that economic downturns hit that sectors hardest where dependence on external ﬁnance is
highest. The effect is further ampliﬁed if a country’s ﬁnancial market is less developed. This
ﬁnding is in line with results found in Rajan and Zingales (1998) who ﬁnd less developed
ﬁnancial markets to be dampening growth if ﬁrms are increasingly dependent on external
ﬁnance.
More direct evidence for the signiﬁcance of the ﬁnancial accelerator effect can be found in
studies that focus on corporate bond interest rate spreads as they are closely linked to the above
mentioned spread. This was ﬁrst conducted in Gertler and Lown (1999) and more rigorously and
more recently for the U.S. in Mody and Taylor (2003), where the authors ﬁnd some evidence for
the signiﬁcance of the ﬁnancial accelerator. The authors use a structural VAR approach to
identify the responses of economic activity to shocks in yield spreads and ﬁnd the spread to be a
signiﬁcant counter-cyclical predictor. Furthermore, they ﬁnd evidence for non-linearities in the
form of an increasing counter-cyclical relationship in the magnitude of the spread. This
non-linearity has already been conjectured by Bernanke et al. (1996). There it is argued the
response to a shock rises more than proportionate with the size of the shock. Signiﬁcant evidence
is also provided in Gilchrist et al. (2009b) where the authors follow essentially the same idea but
build on an improved ﬁrm level data base for the U.S. with additional control variables.
Rather more pessimistic about the empirical content of the ﬁnancial accelerator are Chari
et al. (2007). In contrast to the just mentioned studies they do not rely on VAR methods but
instead propose their method of ‘Business Cycle Accounting.’ They ﬁnd that evidence that could
be interpreted to support the ﬁnancial accelerator is weak as it is not large in magnitude.
However, Christiano and Davis (2006) criticize their ﬁnding by showing that their ‘Business
Cycle Accounting’ is highly sensitive with respect to small parameter changes and that the
method does not take account of externalities leading to an underestimation of the real effects.
A literature related to the cyclicality of spreads builds on asset pricing models. Gomes et al.
(2006) using stock return data and Aliaga-Díaz and Olivero (2010) using U.S. bank data try to
quantify the cyclicality of the spread for external ﬁnance. While the former ﬁnd a pro cyclical
pattern, the latter establish a signiﬁcant negative relationship between the business cycle and the
margin.
Considerably less work has been done on the consumption side. Iacoviello (2004) tries to test
the role of the ﬁnancial accelerator for consumption as laid out in the section on the theoretical
arguments above. He estimates a structural econometric model based on an Euler-equation
representing consumer optimisation under credit constraints and a ﬁnancial accelerator. His
conclusion is that the model behaves well in explaining consumption dynamics in the U.S.15
15 Davis (2010) gives an overview over the literature on the relationship between (various) asset prices and consumption.
This is, of course, relevant in this context, however, no systematic account is taken of the role of an acceleration
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of economically relevant credit constraints, a necessary ingredient to the ﬁnancial acceleration.
A remaining problem is, however, how this micro economic evidence can be used for analysis at
the macro level. Chaney et al. (2010) elaborate on this issue and point to their skepticism that
macro inference based on purely micro economic evidence is valid. The authors do not further
elaborate on this issue but it is not hard to join into this conclusion. Most of the cited literature
focuses on rather speciﬁc data samples, i.e. only publicly listed companies or speciﬁc industries.
Whether these ﬁrms are representative for the macro economy is more than questionable. Apart
from this, aggregation from the micro to the macro level even with representative data is still an
open issue in economics. For consumption, the question is differently as explained. There seems
to be evidence on excessive credit constraint, however, due to the ﬁnancial liberalization that
took place in many industrialized countries, these additional constraints might have weakened.
As constraints are present almost by economic deﬁnition, consumption is important in the light
of the ﬁnancial accelerator although the effects might be lower today than in the past.
With respect to the acceleration mechanism, one has to rely to some extent on indirect
evidence that rests on one or the other assumption in order to draw inference. The results are
largely in favour of an important role of the accelerator mechanism. Additionally some evidence
is found on the important issue of non-linearity, i.e. the ﬁnancial accelerator’s power to increase
in the size of an economic shock. The literature seems supportive for the presence of an
accelerator mechanism both for ﬁrm investment and consumer behaviour. Taking together the
ﬁndings, the evidence and the discussed problems, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
literature supports the qualitative importance of the ﬁnancial accelerator. However, it seems not
possible, so far, to draw quantitative inference on the macro level from this literature.
3.2.2 DSGE Models
The ﬁnancial accelerator was ﬁrst introduced into DSGE models in Bernanke et al. (1999)
although by deviating slightly from the original modelling in Bernanke et al. (1996) and
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) which use hard credit constraints. The basic mechanism operates
through an entrepreneurial sector in the economy which is responsible for production and is
subject to default risk due to shocks. Entrepreneurs have access to collateralized and not
collateralized ﬁnance where the costs for the latter bear additional monitoring costs for the
lender. Thus, this modelling strategy follows Townsend (1979) and the idea of costly credit
monitoring. The constraint to collateralized ﬁnance is the worth of the entrepreneur’s ﬁrm’s
assets. If asset value is pro-cyclical, the need for costly not collateralized debt is counter-cyclical
and the ﬁnancial accelerator emerges as argued already above. The key model variables in this
mechanism. The literature reviewed there does not focus on ampliﬁcation effects but is more concerned with general
consumption determinants.
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leverage) and the spread in credit costs of not collateralized over collateralized debt. The
parameter of interest is the elasticity of the former to the latter as it establishes the link between
the margin and economic activity.
In their original work, Bernanke et al. (1999) calibrate their DSGE model to the U.S.
economy and ﬁnd that the model including the ﬁnancial accelerator is better in explaining the
dynamics in economic time series in response to e.g. monetary shocks. Employing the ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism, they ﬁnd the reaction of output and investment to be signiﬁcantly higher
when employing the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism as compared to a model without the
ﬁnancial accelerator. However, this is by no means a rigorous statistical test of signiﬁcance since
the model has been calibrated.
Meier and Müller (2006) go beyond this and estimate a DSGE model very similar to the one
in Bernanke et al. (1999) through matching impulse-responses from a structural VAR for the
U.S. economy. They focus their analysis on monetary shocks. The parameter estimates which
they obtain for the model’s part on the ﬁnancial accelerator point in the direction predicted by
theory, however, on statistical grounds they turn out to be insigniﬁcant both using standard and
distant metric tests. Although not signiﬁcant, it appears that the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism
helps to replicate the empirical dynamics in the economy’s investment behaviour. The results
were not compared to a model without the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism.
Faia and Monacelli (2007) extend the DSGE model in Bernanke et al. (1999) by including a
Taylor-rule for monetary policy and take account of asset prices in the presence of the ﬁnancial
accelerator. They also calibrate their model to the U.S. economy and ﬁnd that monetary policy
should in general react in response to asset price changes. With respect to the ﬁnancial
accelerator, they ﬁnd the mechanism helpful in explaining the persistence in investment
behaviour. Christensen and Dib (2008) go a step further in constructing a DSGE model which
they estimate using U.S. data. Besides the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism, they include the
Fisher (1933) debt-deﬂation effect and a stabilizing Taylor-rule for monetary policy. Regarding
the estimation, they do not follow Meier and Müller (2006) and Faia and Monacelli (2007) but
estimate the model with respect to the moments found in U.S. data. Especially the inclusion of a
stabilizing Taylor-rule seems important as Bernanke et al. (1999) already argue that such a
policy might counteract the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. However, the authors still ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant role of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism as predicted by the theoretical literature.
As in Meier and Müller (2006) and also Faia and Monacelli (2007) it seems that the ﬁnancial
accelerator affects the dynamic behaviour of investments strongest.
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Study Type Value Signiﬁcance
Bernanke et al. (1999) calibrated –0.028854a
Meier and Müller (2006) estimated –0.0672 no
Faia and Monacelli (2007) calibrated non constantb
Christensen and Dib (2008) estimated –0.0420 yes
Gilchrist et al. (2009a) estimated –0.01 yes
Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) calibrated –0.0370
Elasticity of interest spread with respect to net worth/capital ratio.
a Calculated from authors assumption that a net worth/capital ratio of 0.5 implies a spread of 200 basis points.
b Faia and Monacelli (2007) use a speciﬁcation with a non constant (semi-)elasticity; the steady-state spread is identical to Bernanke
et al. (1999).
Gilchrist et al. (2009a) estimate a DSGE model following rather closely the modelling
framework in Bernanke et al. (1999) and use it to evaluate monetary and ﬁnancial shocks. They
ﬁnd the ﬁnancial accelerator to greatly amplify these in magnitude and duration. Nolan and
Thoenissen (2009) build on Bernanke et al. (1999) and extend their model by including an
additional shock. They refer to this shock as a stochastic component in the efﬁciency of ﬁnancial
markets. This shock has a direct inﬂuence on the worth of the entrepreneur’s ﬁrm’s assets which
is in Bernanke et al. (1999) based on rational expectations. Through the shock, worth can deviate
from its rational expectation’s value and, thus, the shock represents ad hoc irrational behaviour
in ﬁnancial markets. It might be interpreted as to reﬂect other aspects in the decision making
process of investors that are not modelled in detail. Adding this component to the model, the
authors ﬁnd an improved behaviour after calibration to U.S. data.
The models mentioned so far are the ones that aim at modelling the macro economy subject
to the ﬁnancial accelerator in general. As such they are to some extent comparable. The
modelling strategies are basically clustered around the following relationship
si = c(lnwi  lnki); (3.1)
where si is the ﬁrm’s excess cost of capital, i.e. over a risk free rate, wi and ki are the ﬁrm’s net
worth and capital stock. Net worth is to be seen as the sum of current assets and the present
value of future net earnings. c is the elasticity of the interest rate spread between un- vs.
collateralized ﬁnance with respect to worth/capital ratio. Table 3.1 gives the values for this
elasticities in the above mentioned studies.
Besides the just mentioned studies, there are also more speciﬁc DSGE models in the
literature. Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) use a DSGE model to assess the role
of house prices in the U.S. by employing the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. They ﬁnd that
shocks to house prices improve the model’s ability to replicate the properties of aggregate
demand data. Boz and Mendoza (2010) go a step further in a similar environment by including
time varying credit constraints based on risk perception. Bayesian learning about the true risk
33leads to over borrowing and pricing in an up-swing followed by a credit crisis. Gertler et al.
(2004) consider an open economy extension of the Bernanke et al. (1999) model to explore the
role of exchange rate regimes in the Asian ﬁnancial crisis at the end of the 90s. They ﬁnd
ﬁnancial frictions to explain about half of the observed drop in economic activity. Also
concerned with the open economy and the ﬁnancial accelerator are Elekda˘ g et al. (2006) who
estimate a DSGE model for emerging market economies with foreign currency denominated
debt. They ﬁnd this debt to be an important channel of shock transmission as it counteracts the
stabilizing role of exchange rate adjustments. Brubakk et al. (2007) build a small open economy
DSGE model to evaluate the implications of the ﬁnancial accelerator for monetary policy. They
ﬁnd the inﬂation-output trade-off to become less favourable setting tighter restrictions on
monetary policy. Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) introduce asset price shocks and try to assess
whether monetary policy should implement asset pricing rules. They conclude asset prices to
contain additional information besides that included through an interest rate type of rule. Gertler
and Karadi (2010) build a DSGE model using a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism as in Bernanke
et al. (1999) designed to evaluate the effects of the FED’s recent monetary policy that intervenes
directly in the commercial paper market. They conclude that such a policy can help to dampen
the accelerating effect of credit constraint through the actions of an unconstrained central bank.
Besides the mentioned parameter values in Table 3.1 it seems in place to elaborate on the
economic effects of the ﬁnancial accelerator when integrated into a DSGE model. Again we
refer here to the above 6 studies as they are most comparable and rather general. Unfortunately
not all studies compare their results with a model without a ﬁnancial accelerator. Bernanke et al.
(1999) ﬁnd output to react by some 50% and investment by some 100% stronger in response to
monetary shocks. Christensen and Dib (2008) do not ﬁnd this with respect to output but ﬁnd a
comparable number for investment. Examining the impulse response functions reported in the
two articles, it is clear that the dynamics of the economy’s reaction are prolonged due to a
magniﬁed impulse. For technology shocks, Bernanke et al. (1999) ﬁnd the output response to be
between 30 to 40% higher but do not report the investment’s response. Christensen and Dib
(2008) report both but ﬁnd only a signiﬁcant role for the ﬁnancial accelerator for investment
which react by some 50% less. Whether the speed of adjustment is also signiﬁcantly affected
can not be deduced as there are no numbers for this variable reported.
To round up this section it might be worthwhile looking back at the theoretical literature
from where we departed from. Already Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) concluded in their article,
that more work has to be done by future research to fully understand the implications of the
ﬁnancial accelerator for the real economy. One point that the authors made, and which gained
tremendously in importance during the intensiﬁed use of DSGE models in macro economics, is
the role of uncertainty. Both Bernanke et al. (1996) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) work with
deterministic settings and unexpected shocks which are subsequently subject to acceleration.
The growing number of DSGE models using the ﬁnancial accelerator as one corner stone has
34taken up this issue by incorporating the mechanism in a stochastic setting. The results seem
supportive for the ﬁnancial accelerator both on the ﬁrm and the consumer side of the economy.
A ﬁnal note should be on the modelling strategy taken by the literature. It seem nowadays
common sense to use the DSGE setting due to Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2007) as the workhorse model to be extended by additional frictions; in the present case through
the ﬁnancial accelerator.
3.3 Relation to CPB Models
Draper (1991) already included credit constraints in his study on investment in the Dutch
economy. However, there was no acceleration mechanism and, thus, no ﬁnancial accelerator.
CPB’s work is therefore well aware of the basic problem, but might need to take account of
additional economic mechanisms. In this section we provide therefore an overview of the results
found in the literature and their applicability to models currently in use by the CPB. We ﬁrst
focus on the SAFFIER model and, and second, on possible modelling strategies for CPB’s
DSGE modelling project.
3.3.1 SAFFIER
SAFFIER is the short and medium term macro economic model of the CPB. A detailed
description of the most recent model’s version can be found in Kranendonk and Verbruggen
(2006). Here we will just shortly discuss the two model components which are relevant in the
context of the ﬁnancial accelerator. The ﬁrst block that stands in direct relation to the ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism is the demand for capital or put it differently, the investment decision in
the economy. Secondly, it might be also worthwhile to take account of that mechanism in
consumption.
To get an idea of how the ﬁnancial accelerator could in principle be implemented it is
important to remember that the literature considers it as a structural feature of various models.
I.e. the implied credit constraints or ﬁnancial frictions are not just transitory mechanisms but
inﬂuence the economy in the long run. Furthermore, there are two ways of implementing the
mechanism. The ﬁrst one as in Bernanke et al. (1996) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) with a
strong restriction that makes borrowing beyond a particular value of the capital stock impossible,
and the second, where borrowing becomes increasingly costly given asset values. Certainly, the
second option is to be preferred since it does not imply discontinuities.
For the capital decision of the ﬁrm sector, the modelling strategy that would be most simple
to implement is one that is also applied in most of the cited DSGE models. It rests on a linkage
of the spread for ﬁrm borrowings and the net worth/capital ratio implied by equation (3.1).
Values for the elasticity c are given in table 3.1 for relevant models in the literature.
35As such the only missing gap is the determination of wi inside SAFFIER in a pro-cyclical
way as demanded by the accelerator mechanism. Implementing the spread should in principle be
feasible since user cost of capital are already a determinant of the capital stock in SAFFIER. The
inclusion of an equation along (3.1) would of course be ad hoc and based on economic
considerations not explicitly modelled.
The authors of the literature cited above have also turned their attention to consumer
behaviour. This is often done by considering housing as an investment object for consumers and
taking account of the development of its prices in their decision making process. Housing would
in this case be the relevant collateral inﬂuencing consumer behaviour in case of credit
constraints. A possible implementation would follow the idea of a reduced form consumption
function as in Iacoviello (2004). This consumption function is essentially based on a linearized
Euler-equation describing optimal consumption in the presence of housing as an intertemporal
asset reﬂecting wealth. As explained, in such a consumption function both present and future
house prices enter as determinants of consumption. The price multipliers implicitly set the
severity of consumer’s additional borrowing constraints. Such considerations could be used to
complement the existing consumption function in SAFFIER. This would also imply to introduce
forward looking behaviour into SAFFIER. Concerning the severity of consumer credit
constraints one might recall that empirical evidence for continental Europe is weak.
What remains a critical issue in the context of SAFFIER is uncertainty. As argued above,
uncertainty is judged by the literature as being important for the relevance of a model’s
predictions. To deal with this type of criticism, one has no choice but to use DSGE models. This
is what we discuss in the following section.
3.3.2 CPB’s DSGE Model
The construction of a DSGE model for the Dutch economy is under way at CPB. The steps
towards such a model can be found in Elbourne et al. (2008) and Elbourne et al. (2009). One
conclusion from these contributions is that it is important to model capital market imperfections.
The ﬁnancial accelerator is a natural candidate for such a consideration.
In the basic DSGE models as Bernanke et al. (1999) and Meier and Müller (2006), the
ﬁnancial accelerator is implemented through an equation such as 3.1. Depending on the
complexity of the CPB’s DSGE model, of course, the other cited articles could give valuable
hints on how to proceed further with the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. A caveat that one has
to bear in mind when doing so is that the mechanism has some requirements for the underlying
DSGE model to be logically consistent. As it is explained in Bernanke et al. (1999) the model
requires a three sector structure in the form of households, entrepreneurs and retailers.
Households and entrepreneurs are needed to motivate lending and borrowing. The retail sector is
needed to open up the possibility of sticky prices which are a standard ingredient to DSGE
36models. The technical implementation of the ﬁnancial accelerator would take the form of
equation (3.1), as said before.
Going further, there would also be the possibility of introducing a ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism applying to consumption of households through effects on consumer’s wealth which
is at least partly determined by house prices (e.g. Iacoviello (2005) or Iacoviello and Neri
(2010)). This, however, would demand considerably new aspects of modelling introduced to the
existing DSGE models at the CPB. What would be needed in any event is a modiﬁcation of the
consumers’ intertemporal problem to take account of houses as an intertemporal asset. In turn
this demands a housing market to be modelled as well.
3.4 Assessment
In general, it seems that the inclusion of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism in SAFFIER and
the CPB’s DSGE models should be possible. The empirical evidence above suggest that the
mechanism is important. Even more important, the recent events on the capital markets strongly
suggest to take care about the ﬁnancial sector in macro models. The effects of the ﬁnancial crisis
were much stronger than expected, possibly due to ampliﬁcation mechanisms as the ﬁnancial
accelerator. To keep such a project tractable, it should be started with the ﬁrm’s investment
modelling strategy as integration in existing models is more straightforward. This view is
supported by Smets et al. (2010) who compare the two quite complex DSGE models currently
employed by the ECB of which just one explicitly models the ﬁnancial sector using the ﬁnancial
accelerator. It should also be noted that the ﬁnancial accelerator is not only important as an
ampliﬁer of ﬁnancial or monetary shocks. Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christensen and Dib
(2008) ﬁnd that it has also a signiﬁcant impact on the effects of e.g. technology shocks.
The introduction of the ﬁnancial accelerator to SAFFIER should imply less practical
problems since the model is deterministic. Calibration of an equation comparable to (3.1) could
be done in accordance with the values in table 3.1. Integration of the ﬁnancial accelerator in
CPB’s DSGE models might be more demanding especially if the model is to be estimated.
However, it is also possible to work in a partly estimated setting where an existing estimated
DSGE model is extended by a calibrated ﬁnancial sector subject to the ﬁnancial accelerator. This
is expected to reduce the complexity of such a project considerably. In general the
implementation should begin with the ﬁrm’s investment behaviour since the integration strategy
seems to be more straightforward and empirically founded than for the consumption side of the
economy.
37384 The Bank Lending Channel
Bank credit ﬂuctuates strongly over the business cycle. Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) show
that the volatility of gross credit ﬂows in the US is an order of magnitude larger than that of
GDP. In addition, the volatility of credit contraction is substantially larger than that of credit
expansion (28% vs. 18%). At the onset of a recession, bank credit is sharply reduced and at the
end of a recession it expands again more gradually. The reduction in bank credit may be due
both to reduced credit supply, to reduced demand, or both. Figure 4.1 compares reported credit
conditions in the Euro area and the US over the last two cycles. During the latest recession, over
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two-thirds of banks reported a tightening of credit conditions. For the Euro area, a comparable
tightening is also reported for the 2002-03 recession, but in the U.S. conditions were not raised
as much. Figure 4.1 suggests that during recessions the credit supply curve shifts inward. The
question that will occupy us in the next few sections is whether a shift in the credit supply curve
matters for the depth or the length of a recession.
39The ﬁndings of Mishkin (1978) and Bernanke (1983), that bank lending did matter during the
Great Depression, did not easily ﬁt into the then available theoretical framework, which regarded
portfolios as instantaneously adjustable and did not distinguish between ﬁnancial markets and
ﬁnancial intermediation. This led Bernanke and Blinder (1988) to present a simple extension of
the IS-LM model with a separate credit market to analyse the effect of a bank lending channel on
monetary policy. In their model, the effects of the bank lending channel arise from the imperfect
substitutability of money and credit for both banks and non-ﬁnancial agents. More generally, for
the bank lending channel to be operative, two conditions have to be satisﬁed:
1. banks react to a liquidity shortage by cutting back loans, instead of issuing more certiﬁcates of
deposit;
2. bank loans and market ﬁnance are imperfect substitutes, so that borrowers cannot easily turn to
alternatively sources of funds if bank lending is curtailed.
The next sections discuss each of these conditions. Section 4.1 discusses the conditions under
which bank loans and market ﬁnance are imperfectly substitutable. Section 4.2 discusses reasons
why banks may respond to changes in their balance sheet composition by adjusting their credit
supply. Section 4.3 presents empirical evidence on the bank lending channel.
4.1 Financial Intermediation and Credit Supply
What is the value added of a ﬁnancial intermediary? Why is any difference between borrowing
and lending rates not arbitraged away? The fundamental insight of Jaffee and Russell (1976) and
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) was that information needed by the lender to assess the risk involved in
the loan is often in substantial measure private to the borrower: the borrower’s earning potential,
the risk characteristics of the investment project, etc. In these circumstances, lenders will want to
screen potential borrowers before granting the loan, and to monitor the borrower for the duration
of the loan. Jaffee and Russell and Stiglitz and Weiss discuss a setting where the interest rate
charged selects the borrowers in high- and low-risk types. In this situation a lender may prefer to
ration credit rather than to raise interest rates and attract a higher proportion of high-risk types.
Another consequence of asymmetric information is that the loan contract is incomplete. This
creates a moral hazard problem, that may be partly resolved through monitoring. However, As
monitoring is costly, it will not fully resolve the asymmetry in information (Townsend, 1979).
The optimal loan contract is a standard debt contract with a ﬁxed interest rate, and an audit upon
default. Because of the monitoring costs, projects with a relatively low return may be rationed
(Williamson, 1986). The general consequence of incomplete information in ﬁnancial markets is
therefore that differences between borrowing and lending rates are not arbitraged away:
borrowers may be rationed and a loan contract, if available, carries a surcharge to compensate
the lender for the expected cost of monitoring.
40The essential role of banks as ﬁnancial intermediaries is then to mitigate the effects of market
incompleteness by engaging in risk and information pooling (see e.g. Gorton and Winton, 2003;
Freixas and Rochet, 2008, chapter 2). There are a number of reasons why banks are better able
to provide ﬁnancial services than individual depositors
1. commitment: a bank acts as a commitment device against renegotiation of the terms of the loan
contract (as this might lead to a bank run), something an individual lender cannot credibly do
(Diamond and Rajan, 2001).
2. economies of scope: a bank can offer loans of various duration and risk, if the depositors are
heterogeneous. Thus a bank acts as a risk diversiﬁcation unit (Pyle, 1971). In particular, a bank
offers liquidity insurance to households and ﬁrms (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
3. economies of scale (Williamson, 1986): the bank can monitor the borrowers’ creditworthiness
more efﬁciently than private investors can, because the bank pools the monitoring efforts of
individual depositors.
4. Banks typically enter into a long-term relationship with their borrowers, as a consequence of the
information that the bank accumulates during its monitoring activities (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan,
1992). This inside information leads to a monitoring cost advantage of the bank, the rents of
which are shared between the bank and the ﬁrm.
5. As monitoring is costly, and monitoring costs are non-veriﬁable, banks too face a moral hazard
problem (Holmström and Tirole, 1997). Banks must earn a positive return on their monitoring
activity. To avoid that banks gain a net proﬁt from monitoring, which would not be
incentive-compatible, it is necessary that banks take part of the risk of a ﬁrm’s investment
projects. Hence part of the capital supplied by the bank is illiquid, which restricts the options of
the bank to terminate the partnership with a customer ﬁrm. This is an advantage for the owners
of the ﬁrm, as it lowers liquidity risk. It also implies that the net worth of the bank affects the
amount of credit supplied.
The comparative advantage of banks as intermediaries between uninformed private investors and
lenders thus gives rise to a number of theoretical predictions concerning the degree to which
bank loans and market credit are substitutable. Bank credit is more expensive than internal funds
for borrowers as internal funds escape the need for monitoring. However, the liquidity insurance
offered by banks obviates the need to hold large cash reserves as a buffer to ﬁnance volatile
expenditure categories like inventories or durable consumption goods. Hence even ﬁrms and
households with sufﬁcient cash ﬂow will need bank credit to stay liquid. Bank credit is generally
less expensive than direct access to the capital market, provided that the ﬁrm has sufﬁcient
collateral, because of the monitoring cost advantage of banks. On this account, bank lending is
especially important as a source of funds for small ﬁrms and households. For large ﬁrms, this
monitoring cost disadvantage is less important and they can more easily substitute commercial
paper for bank loans. Finally, banks and ﬁrms are involved in a strategic partnership, in which it
41is costly for either side to terminate the relationship and ﬁnd another customer, or switch to
another bank. This also implies that bank assets are for a substantial part tied up in existing
loans, and as a result illiquid.
4.2 Bank Liquidity and Balance Sheet Effects
The second condition for the existence of a bank lending channel is that banks cannot easily
adjust their balance sheets if they face a liquidity shortage by attracting new funds. This
condition may be put in a bit broader perspective by distinguishing two aspect of the bank’s
balance sheet that may affect its supply behaviour:
• Banks may face a liquidity shortage, i.e. there exists a severe maturity mismatch between their
assets and liabilities;
• Banks may be undercapitalised. This occurs e.g. if they have lower capital than allowed for
under the Basel accords.16 More generally, the amount of bank capital affects their risk-bearing
capacity and their preferred portfolio composition, so that there exists an optimal capitalization
rate, that may not be achieved.
We discuss both points in turn.
4.2.1 Bank Liquidity Shortage
If banks face a liquidity shortage, why cannot they simply restore liquidity by attracting new
funds, either by issuing new equity, by issuing new deposit certiﬁcates, or by selling insured
loans? In a world of asymmetric information, issuing new equity in times of ﬁnancial stress is
expensive for existing shareholders, because the bank must offer a substantial discount to
overcome the informational disadvantage of new shareholders (Calomiris and Wilson, 2004).
The second possibility for banks to improve their balance sheet in the face of a liquidity
shortage is to issue additional certiﬁcates of deposits (CD’s). Romer and Romer (1990)
hypothesize that this is precisely what banks do under these circumstances, because they ﬁnd no
evidence of a curtailment of bank lending during episodes of restrictive monetary policy.
However, Kashyap and Stein (1993) argue that bank lending is bound to react slower than
measures of the money stock to a tightening of monetary policy, because of contractual
constraints, and the need to ﬁnance increased inventory holdings of customer ﬁrms at the start of
a slowdown. As a result, the effects of monetary policy on bank lending may realize themselves
mostly after the initial episode of restrictive policy. In addition, Kashyap and Stein (2000) use
16 We do not go into the issue of regulation of banks, except to note that regulation is motivated by another type of market
imperfection, the lack of contracts that are contingent on macro risks, e.g. liquidity risk (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
Without contingent contracts the probability of a bank default is always positive, and the issue is whether regulation can
improve the equilibrium. See Bijlsma et al. (2010), section 5, for a literature survey.
42micro panel data to demonstrate that less liquid banks do reduce their loan supply more in
periods of restrictive monetary policy. Ludvigson (1998) also ﬁnds direct evidence of an effect
of monetary policy on loan supply.
To explain the apparent reduction in bank lending following tight monetary episodes, Stein
(1998) constructs a model of adverse selection between banks. Banks limit their use of CD’s to
signal their ﬁnancial soundness. A ‘sound’ bank will react to a withdrawal of insured demand
deposits by cutting back loans, a ‘bad’ bank will resort to using more uninsured external ﬁnance.
A different explanation is offered by Diamond and Rajan (2006), who argue that banks
themselves do not like to issue new demand deposits to lend out as illiquid assets in times of
restrictive monetary policy, because the withdrawal risk of these deposits is higher as well.
The third possibility, selling uninsured loans to third parties, in itself is not attractive either,
as banks have a special relation with their debtors (James, 1987). Selling of the loans would
weaken or terminate this relationship. In addition, as banks have inside information about their
debtors, (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992, cf.. Section 4.1 above), selling of debtor claims faces the
lemons problem. The lemons problem can be overcome by securitization, however.
Securitization is a relatively recent ﬁnancial innovation that offers a solution to the problem
of converting illiquid loans to liquid assets. In the U.S., securitization of mortgage loans started
in the seventies. By late 2000, 46% of all mortgage loans was securitized. In the EU,
securitization started only after the introduction of the Euro, and the size of the market is still
considerably smaller than in the US. The basic idea is that the default risk in a loan is to a large
extent idiosyncratic, and can therefore be diversiﬁed away by repackaging a sufﬁciently large
number of these loans in a security with a given risk characteristic of the associated cash ﬂow
(Cowley and Cummins, 2005). The security can be sold on the market, as the asymmetric
information problem has been solved through diversiﬁcation.17 The risk of the newly created
security is of a macroeconomic nature, not unlike the risk of a (sectoral) stock market index
fund. As a result of securitization, banks can remove illiquid loans from their balance sheet. The
role of banks as a transformation unit of liquidity (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) is thus
substantially reduced. It follows that monetary policy that uses the bank lending channel by
targeting the liquidity of banks is less effective. This holds in particular for loans related to
mortgages or credit cards. Securitization of ﬁrms’ loans does not occur, as it would sever the
special client-bank relationship, see Section 4.1.18
4.2.2 The Bank Capital Channel
Next to liquidity, another balance sheet item deemed important in the credit view of monetary
transmission is the net worth of banks. The importance of bank net worth is already pointed out
17 Of course, this creates a new moral hazard problem, by reducing the bank’s monitoring incentives.
18 However, securitization of single complete ﬁrms is not uncommon (Cowley and Cummins, 2005).
43in the analysis of Holmström and Tirole (1997), where banks have to participate in the risk
taking of ﬁrms to resolve an incentive compatibility problem. Van den Heuvel (2006) discusses a
separate ‘bank capital channel,’ as distinct from the bank lending channel (i.e. liquidity), in
which the capitalization of banks plays an important role. Because of a maturity mismatch
between assets and liabilities, an interest rate change has an effect on bank’s proﬁts, hence on its
net worth. In case of an increase in interest rates proﬁts go down and, as a result of regulatory
constraints, banks will either need to issue new equity or cut back on their loans. The effect is
similar to a ﬁnancial accelerator effect for real ﬁrms, caused by a collateral requirement (see
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), in that the required rate of return goes up, while the market value
of the bank goes down.
Bank capitalization is also important because it is subject to regulatory constraints. Blum and
Hellwig (1995) were the ﬁrst to study the macroeconomic implications of the original Basel
agreement. They pointed out the existence of a positive feedback loop, whereby a recession
leads to lower bank capital, which reduces bank lending and reinforces the recession. Under the
Basel accords, a bank’s assets are weighted with a measure of credit risk, so that a risky portfolio
is valued less and lowers the capitalization ratio of a bank. If a bank’s credit risk increases, the
imputed portfolio value decreases, and the bank’s capitalization may fall below the imposed
threshold value. This drives up the cost of capital for the bank and forces it to cut back its risky
loans (Thakor, 1996). In times of recession, all banks are hit simultaneously by increased credit
risk, so that credit supply peters out. The net effect of Basel is therefore procyclical (Kashyap
and Stein, 2004; Gordy and Howells, 2006; Drumond, 2009).19
A paper along these lines is Bolton and Freixas (2006), who analyse the transmission effects
of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model of the ﬁnancial sector, with bank lending and
securities markets. Bank lending is constrained by capital adequacy requirements, and
asymmetric information adds a cost to outside bank equity capital. As a result, the cost of capital
for banks is endogenous, and the cost of bank lending as well. Bolton and Freixas show that
multiple equilibria may arise, including a ‘credit crunch’ equilibrium with low bank capital and
high costs of lending.
4.3 Empirical Support for the Bank Lending Channel
There is wide empirical support for a limited substitutability between bank loans and ﬁnancial
market access, in particular for small ﬁrms. Hoshi et al. (1991) show that Japanese ﬁrms that are
part of an industrial group (a ‘keiretsu,’ with a city bank at its core) display a lower sensitivity of
investment to cash ﬂow than ﬁrms that are not part of an industrial group. Petersen and Rajan
19 Basel III strives to repair the negative side effects of Basel II by imposing higher capital ratios and by imposing ﬂexible
leverage constraints.
44(1994, 1995) ﬁnd that for small ﬁrms a close relationship between the ﬁrm and one or a few
banks increases the availability of credit to the ﬁrm, compared to ﬁrms who borrow from a large
number of creditors. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) analyse the response of small versus large
manufacturing ﬁrms to monetary policy. They ﬁnd that small ﬁrms account for a signiﬁcantly
disproportionate share of the manufacturing decline that follows tightening of monetary policy.
Khwaja and Mian (2008) show that, while banks pass their liquidity shocks on to ﬁrms, large
ﬁrms – particularly those with strong business or political ties – completely compensate this loss
by additional borrowing through the credit market. Small ﬁrms are unable to do so and face large
drops in overall borrowing and increased ﬁnancial distress.
4.3.1 Bank Liquidity
The empirical support for an effect of monetary policy on bank credit supply is mixed. A
fundamental problem is how to distinguish supply shifts from demand shifts. Kashyap and Stein
(1993) use the dating method employed by Romer and Romer (1990) to identify periods of tight
monetary policy. They ﬁnd that tighter monetary policy leads to a shift in ﬁrms’ mix of external
ﬁnancing: commercial paper issuance rises while bank loans fall. They take this to imply that
contractionary policy can indeed reduce loan supply. Moreover, these shifts in loan supply
appear to affect real activity through investment expenditures, although the effect is not very
large. Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) argue that the effect of monetary policy on the ﬁnancing
mix is mainly a composition effect. It is due to the larger exposure of small ﬁrms to business
cycles, (see Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). For small ﬁrms the bank/non-bank credit mix does not
change over the cycle. They interpret their result as indicating that small ﬁrms face a more
severely restricted overall access to credit during the downward phase of the cycle, rather than
just restricted access to bank credit. In reply, Kashyap et al. (1996) point out that also in the
subsample of large ﬁrms the ratio of commercial paper to bank credit increases following a
monetary contraction. Indeed, Kashyap et al. (1993) show that the spread between the federal
funds rate and the rate on commercial paper widens during periods of tight monetary policy,
which also suggests a relative shift from bank loans to commercial paper for all agents
combined.
More micro-econometric evidence is given by Ludvigson (1998) and Kashyap and Stein
(2000). Ludvigson estimates the change in the composition of consumer loans in response to a
change in monetary policy. She ﬁnds that unanticipated changes in monetary policy have an
effect on the composition of consumer credit. However, the effects of this shift in debt
composition on the level of consumption are found to be rather small. Kashyap and Stein use a
panel data set of individual banks to show that less liquid banks do reduce their loan supply in
response to tighter monetary policy. This behaviour is stronger for smaller banks. The size of the
effect on macroeconomic activity is left open, however. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) also
ﬁnd that well-capitalized banks can better shield their lending from monetary policy shocks,
45which agrees with the bank lending channel hypothesis. The existence of non-price channels
may be demonstrated more easily in markets that are ﬁnancially less developed. Khwaja and
Mian (2008) use unexpected shocks from nuclear tests in Pakistan to show that for the same ﬁrm
borrowing from two different banks, its loan from the bank experiencing a 1 percent larger
decline in liquidity drops by an additional 0.6 percent. This agrees well with Paravisini (2008),
who tests for ﬁnancial constraints and underinvestment by local banks. Banks are found to
expand lending by $0.66 in response to an additional dollar of external ﬁnancing.
Den Haan et al. (2007) distinguish between a number of components of bank loans, viz.
commercial and industrial loans, real estate loans, and consumer credit. Using U.S. data, they
ﬁnd that these components behave quite differently during a monetary tightening episode, so that
the results of standard VAR analyses suffer from aggregation bias. In particular, real estate and
consumer loans fall signiﬁcantly, while commercial loans go up (in agreement with the argument
of Kashyap and Stein (1993)). During non-monetary downturns on the other hand, commercial
loans fall, while real estate and consumer credit do not show any marked response. Black et al.
(2010) look speciﬁcally at the effect of monetary policy on mortgage loan supply. They ﬁnd that
only loan supply of banks who ﬁnance subprime mortgages at the margin from unsecured
deposits is affected, in that the interest rate spread of these banks increases in times of tight
money. The implication is that over the sample period, 1995–2006, the larger part of mortgage
loan supply was not affected by monetary policy (possibly as a result of ongoing securitization).
For the Netherlands, Van Ees et al. (1999) test the adjustment of Dutch banks’ balance sheets
in times of monetary policy changes during the period 1957–1991. In case of changes in the
ofﬁcial interest rate, the volume of bank loans is not affected and banks display a kind of
buffer-stock behaviour by diminishing their publicly traded assets. In situations with quantity
restrictions on the growth of net money creation, however, the volume of loans is affected
signiﬁcantly when the quantity restriction is withdrawn, thereby fulﬁlling a necessary condition
for the bank lending channel to be effective. Garretsen and Swank (2003), using a series of VAR
models, estimate the effect of monetary policy on bank lending, production, and inﬂation. They
do not ﬁnd any evidence that a bank lending channel affects real activity. Bank loans do not start
to decrease until twenty months after the monetary contraction, and private spending is hardly
affected at all. As a possible explanation, the authors suggest that ﬁrms and households adjust
their portfolio holdings in response to monetary tightening. De Haan (2003), using micro data,
ﬁnds a bank lending channel for unsecured lending, i.e. loans not backed by a government
guarantee. In agreement with the results of Kashyap and Stein (2000), the channel is stronger for
small banks. However, De Haan does not look at the effect of the reduction in loan supply on
private spending, so that the quantitative impact of the bank lending channel on real activity is
unclear.
Altunba¸ s et al. (2009) claim that the changing role of credit intermediaries due to
securitization has modiﬁed the effectiveness of the bank lending channel and banks’ ability to
46grant loans. Using a novel database of securitization activity and a large sample of European
banks, the paper ﬁnds that the use of securitization shelters banks’ loan supply from the effects
of monetary policy. Securitization activity has also strengthened banks’ capacity to supply new
loans. This capacity, however, depends on business cycle conditions and, notably, on banks’
risks positions.
4.3.2 Bank Capital
The evidence for an effect of bank capitalization on bank lending is fairly strong. Bernanke and
Lown (1991) discuss the effects of a curtailment of bank lending on the recession of 1990-91 in
the US (the ‘credit crunch’). Bank capitalization had dropped on the eve of the recession as a
result of the burst of a real estate bubble in New England and a tightening of monetary policy.
Bernanke and Lown ﬁnd a clear relation between the capitalization of banks and the growth of
credit supply. However, the relation between bank capitalization and real economic activity is
less clear. In particular, they do not ﬁnd any relation between capitalization and employment
growth. Hancock and Wilcox (1993) use the credit crunch episode to estimate the impact on
bank credit ﬂows of such real and ﬁnancial factors as weak loan demand, banks’ revised
estimates of the risks of and returns on lending, and banks’ capital conditions. Some banks
apparently reduced their lending to satisfy regulators’ capital requirements. Peek and Rosengren
(1995) also ﬁnd that the reduction in bank capital in 1990 caused New England banks to
contract, independent of demand conditions. Kishan and Opiela (2000) provide evidence of a
bank capital channel of monetary policy in the United States over the period 1980 to 1995. They
test for bank loan supply shifts by segregating banks according to asset size and capital leverage
ratio. They ﬁnd that the loan growth of both small and undercapitalized banks is signiﬁcantly
affected by policy.
Altunba¸ s et al. (2002) examine evidence for a bank lending channel in Europe. Following the
approach suggested by Kishan and Opiela (2000), they use bank balance sheet data to estimate
the response of bank lending to changes in monetary policy stance between 1991 and 1999.
Using a panel data approach they ﬁnd that across the EMU systems, undercapitalised banks (of
any size) tend to respond more to a change in policy. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) use the
excess capital-to-asset ratio to better control for the riskiness of banks’ portfolios, and to
disentangle the effects of the ‘bank lending channel’ from those of the ‘bank capital channel.’
Using Italian data, they ﬁnd evidence of both a bank lending channel and a bank capital channel,
in which the effect of a ﬁnancial shock on credit supply is larger, the larger is the maturity
mismatch between assets and liabilities.
The evidence for an effect of bank capitalization on real activity is mixed. Hancock and
Wilcox (1998) present estimates of the effects of the 1990 capital crunch on bank loans and real
activity. They ﬁnd that small banks shrank their loan portfolios considerably more than large
banks and that real economic activity was reduced more by capital declines and loan declines at
47small banks than at large banks. Hubbard et al. (2002) ﬁnd that banks with less capital charge
higher loan rates, in particular to ﬁrms for which information costs are important and that cannot
easily switch banks. This creates an empirically observed incentive for these ﬁrms to hold higher
cash reserves, which affects their cost of capital. Ashcraft (2006) ﬁnds little effect of the share of
ﬁnancially constrained banks on output, which leads him to conclude that the bank lending
channel is not important for output ﬂuctuations.
Japan constitutes an important natural experiment in the effects of bank capitalization on the
real economy. Japanese banks held considerable amounts of domestic stock at the time of the
collapse of the Nikkei in 1990-91. In addition, they had substantial positions in Japanese real
estate in the form of collateral. The value of all these assets was reduced by two thirds and more
in just two years, leaving Japanese banks severely undercapitalized by 1992. This problem was
for a long time not addressed by policy, so that the undercapitalization persisted for several
years. Woo (2003) shows that this led to a contraction of credit supply in Japan and Peek and
Rosengren (2000) that it affected mortgage loan supply of Japanese banks in the US. The
undercapitalization of banks is often used to explain the stagnation of the Japanese economy in
the nineties (e.g. Bayoumi, 2001; Kuttner and Posen, 2001). However, Hayashi and Prescott
(2002) argue that the main cause of the stagnation is a productivity slowdown, and not a lack of
funds for investment. In fact, Japanese investment fell most of all expenditure categories during
the nineties (Horioka, 2006), so that a link with credit supply is plausible. Indeed, Goyal and
Yamada (2004) and Hori et al. (2006) explain the investment decline partly from a lack of bank
credit, but mostly as a consequence of a fall in the value of ﬁrms’ assets, i.e. a ﬁnancial
accelerator effect.20
4.3.3 Bank Lending in DSGE Models
The empirical evidence on the bank lending channel cited in Section 4.3 shows that both the
capitalization ratio and the liquidity position of a bank have a clear effect on its lending. Illiquid
and undercapitalized banks reduce their lending and charge higher rates for loans. On the basis
of this evidence, the macroeconomic impact of this mechanism is difﬁcult to assess, however. If
banks succeed in rapidly adjusting their balance sheets, the effect may be short-lived. In this
case, the impact of bank balance sheet composition on capital costs for borrowers is small. On
the other hand, in the presence of destabilizing feedback loops, economy-wide cuts in bank
lending due to undercapitalization lending will further reduce the value of bank capital and delay
adjustment. Therefore, as in the case of the ﬁnancial accelerator, the full effect of this
transmission channel can only be assessed in a general equilibrium framework.
20 Neither study tries to distinguish between the effects of changes in ﬁrm collateral value, and changes in bank capital. As
the two were heavily correlated over the sample period, the estimates may have picked up a bank lending channel effect.
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composition on economic activity in a general equilibrium setting.21 These models all use the
bank capital channel, in which the capitalisation ratio of banks affects their lending behaviour.22
Angeloni and Faia (2009) introduce banks into a standard DSGE model. As in Diamond and
Rajan (2000, 2001), the intermediation role of banks is based on the disciplinary threat of bank
runs: if the entrepreneur offers too low a return on its loan, the bank defaults, a bank run occurs,
and the investment project has to be liquidated (point 1 in Section 4.1). The threat of a bank run
determines an optimal deposit/capital ratio that balances the desire of the bank to attract more
deposits with the risk of a bank run. A higher level of bank capital lowers the risk of a bank run,
but also reduces proﬁts. Low capitalization ratios and high interest rates therefore reduce bank
loan supply. Conversely, high entrepreneurial proﬁts boost loan supply, as they reduce the
probability of a default of the entrepreneur and therefore the risk of a bank run. Angeloni and
Faia use this framework to study the role of banks in the transmission of shocks, the effects of
monetary policy when banks are exposed to runs, and the interplay between monetary policy and
Basel-like capital ratios. They ﬁnd that procyclical capital requirements are destabilizing and
can only be partly offset by monetary policy. The welfare loss of introducing procyclical capital
regulation can be substantial at a few percent of consumption.
De Walque et al. (2010) specify a DSGE model with a heterogeneous banking sector. Banks
are subdivided into merchant banks and deposit banks. Merchant banks invest in securities and
ﬁrm loans and obtain their funds from the interbank market or shareholder capital. They face a
quadratic cost of default on their interbank borrowing, so that an optimal capitalization rate
exists. Deposit banks use own funds and household deposits to invest in loans to the interbank
market and securities (securities are exogenous). Both types of banks are subject to regulation by
the Central Bank. The model contains two balance sheet feedback mechanisms: a ﬁnancial
accelerator along the lines expounded in Chapter 3.1 and a bank capital channel that affects the
interbank loan market. If merchant banks have low capital, their default rate is higher so that
deposit banks will charge higher interest rates in the interbank loan market. As a result,
merchant banks have a problem attracting sufﬁcient funds, which lowers their proﬁts and slows
down their recovery. In addition, the problems in the interbank market trigger a ﬁnancial
accelerator feedback loop in the real sector of the economy, further delaying recovery. The
Central Bank can stabilize interest rates through liquidity injections in the interbank market.23
Meh and Moran (2010) develop a DSGE model in which banks act as intermediaries between
investors and entrepreneurs. Bank capital invested in a ﬁrm mitigates an agency problem
21 The larger part of DSGE models that incorporate a non-price credit channel uses feedback mechanisms based on the
balance sheet of ﬁrms and households (the ﬁnancial accelerator), see Chapter 3.
22 Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) develop a canonical framework to think about credit market frictions and aggregate
economic activity in the context of the current crisis.
23 The liquidity injection is in the form of commodities, as the model is of the RBC type, without money.
49between banks and their creditors (see point 5 in Section 4.1). Banks with low capital must
reduce their supply of proﬁtable loans and therefore attract fewer deposits as well. As a result,
these banks cannot expand at the same rate as well-capitalized banks with the same book value.
This negative feedback loop characterizes the bank capital channel. The model is calibrated
using parameter estimates from other authors and matches the U.S. economy in a number of
respects. The authors ﬁnd that negative shocks in bank capital create sizeable declines in output
and investment. Technology shocks are also ampliﬁed through this channel, as they affect the
market value of ﬁrms, and therefore the capitalization of banks.
In Gerali et al. (2010) the bank capital channel is generated by an exogenous regulatory
constraint, as in Van den Heuvel (2006). The authors introduce an imperfectly competitive
banking sector into a DSGE model with ﬁnancial frictions. Banks have some degree of
monopoly power, which enables them to offer different lending and borrowing rates to
households and ﬁrms. The margins charged on loans depend on the capitalization ratio of the
bank and on the degree of interest rate stickiness. In addition, the loans supplied are
collateralized, so that households and ﬁrms face a credit constraint that depends on their net
worth. The model thus contains both a bank capital channel and a ﬁnancial accelerator. The
model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using data for the Euro area. The authors ﬁnd that
the banking sector partially attenuates the effects of demand shocks, while it boosts supply
shocks. Second, shocks originating in the banking sector explain the larger share of the fall of
output in 2008 in the euro area. Third, an unexpected destruction of bank capital has a
substantial impact on the real economy and particularly on investment.
The papers discussed do not provide direct information about the macroeconomic impact of
raising capital requirements, as in the Basel III proposal. However, the papers of Gerali et al.,
Meh and Moran, and De Walque et al. do offer information about the macroeconomic
adjustment path following a fall in bank capital. Estimated adjustment periods vary, but are long
in all cases. In de model of De Walque et al., it takes about seven years for output to recover
after a shock to bank capital, although the adjustment period can be shortened substantially if the
central bank resorts to liquidity injections. In the model of Meh and Moran the adjustment
period for the bank capitalization ratio is about ten years, whereas output is still not back on
track at that time. Gerali et al. do not show the full length of the adjustment path, but after 5
years none of the key macroeconomic variables is close to the benchmark path. 24
24 These adjustment periods are longer than those reported in Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010), where the
average adjustment period over all models used is about three years for a two-year implementation period. Moreover, the
short-term effects of raising the target capital ratio in the Macroeconomic Assessment Group study are substantially
smaller than those in the DSGE models discussed here. It is difﬁcult to assess the causes for this difference in outcomes
without detailed knowledge of the models involved, in particular with respect to the presence of the balance sheet
transmission channels discussed in the present paper.
504.4 Relation to CPB Analyses
Once, macroeconometric models used at CPB contained a monetary sector (Hasselman et al.,
1983; Van Erp et al., 1989) with a separate market for bank credit. In Hasselman et al. rationing
of short-term bank credit may occur. Supply and demand of bank credit are modelled as standard
portfolio equations, with interest rates and lagged portfolio holdings as their main arguments.25
In addition, the actual amount of bank credit affects portfolio decisions. The interest rate on
bank credit is pegged to the discount rate of the central bank. The actual amount of bank credit
equals the minimum of supply and demand. Bank credit affects inventory investment, so that the
model does contain a bank lending channel.26 In Van Erp et al. rationing of bank credit does not
occur, and the interest rate channel is the only channel of monetary transmission.
Bijlsma et al. (2010), section 4, brieﬂy discuss the bank lending channel in relation to capital
adequacy requirements and the Basel accords.
4.5 Assessment
The existence of a separate bank lending channel is theoretically founded in the asymmetric
information between borrowers and lenders. Banks enjoy economies of scale and scope in the
acquisition of credit that households and (small) ﬁrms lack. The empirical evidence on the
quantitative importance of the bank lending channel is however inconclusive. There is
substantial empirical evidence that monetary policy affects bank lending. It appears that
especially small banks are affected by a tightening of monetary policy. Large, well-capitalized,
banks are better able to shield their borrowers from changes in monetary tightness.
The effect of changes in loan supply on private sector spending is more ambiguous. Many
studies do not ﬁnd a substantial effect of monetary policy on real activity via the bank lending
channel. It appears that at least part of the disruption of bank loan supply can be offset by ﬁrms
and households by changing their portfolios. In addition, securitization has blunted the use of
monetary policy to restrict bank loan supply, especially with respect to the mortgage market.
However, there is evidence that the activity of small ﬁrms is affected.
There is substantial microeconometric evidence that shocks to bank capital do affect bank
loan supply.27 The conclusion also applies to large banks, even if to a lesser degree than to small
banks. In addition, under-capitalized banks appear to charge higher interest rates, which raises
capital costs for ﬁrms and households alike. Empirical evidence as to the macroeconomic effects
25 Bank capital does not play a role in the portfolio equations, so that the bank capital channel is not present.
26 A peculiar element of the inventory equation is that inventory formation depends on bank credit even if ﬁrms are not
credit-constrained.
27 The ﬁnding that the bank lending channel is quantitatively unimportant as a transmission channel of monetary policy
therefore applies speciﬁcally to the bank liquidity channel.
51of the bank capital channel is mixed. If the capital shock is limited to a subset of banks, macro
effects do not appear to be present. Evidence from DSGE models suggests that an economy-wide
shock to bank capital has substantial and long-lasting effects on economic activity.
525 Trade and Finance
World trade has dropped tremendously during the ﬁnancial crisis. In pure numbers it did so even
stronger than production. Levchenko et al. (2009) analyse U.S. monthly and quarterly data on
exports and imports. As seen in world trade, the drop in imports- and exports is quite more
dramatic than in GDP. Most strongly did trade in consumer durables and industry supply as well
as intermediates fall. It did so evenly across trading partners. Both, quantities and prices of
traded goods fell, however, the reduction in quantity was economically more important. The
exceptionality can also be seen in the contribution of Grossman and Meissner (2010) who put
this crisis in historical perspective especially with respect to the great depression of the 1930s.
The relative movement between trade and production is an interesting occurrence, since it
displays a pattern that we do not expect looking at standard economic models. A widely and
commonly used model to explain trade patterns is the well known gravity model28. To put it in
simple words, the model explains trade between two partner countries to be a function of the
relevant distance between the countries and the size of their economies usually measured by
GDP. If economic size, i.e. GDP, is the important economic ﬁgure during a crisis, the gravity
model should at least to some extent be able to replicate the size of the drop in trade and relate it
to the drop in production or GDP. However, recent evidence points in a different direction. The
drop in trade is by far larger than predicted by a typical gravity model, see e.g. Amiti and
Weinstein (2009) and the references therein.
Following this, we are left with a puzzle or at least with a situation which is not adequately
explained by typical models motivated by past observations. The question that remains to be
answered is why did indeed trade drop so much in excess of production as it did. This question
already suggests to look for something as an ampliﬁcation mechanism analogous to the ﬁnancial
accelerator which we were looking at above.
Below, we will look at the literature in order to come closer to an answer. As the focus of this
document is on the relationship between ﬁnancial markets and the real economy, we will focus
on ﬁnance related arguments. Other arguments are e.g. greater trade barriers during crises, direct
demand and supply effect or demand composition effects as well as arguments related to the
supply chain architecture of world production. Demand composition and supply chain effects
are likely to interact. In general, the drop in demand was most drastic in the automotive and
durable investment goods industry, see e.g. Eaton et al. (2010). Comparing the composition of
trade and general production reveals that trade is biased towards such goods. Therefore trade
should be more heavily affected than production in general, the bias is however not strong
enough to explain the drastic drop in trade relative to production. The production of such goods
28 The model was introduced by Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963). It owes its name due to the formal similarity to
Newton’s universal law of gravity.
53is heavily spread across countries through the global supply chain. The drop in demand for such
goods therefore immediately spreads out among many countries. During a crisis, a country
might be tempted to protect its own economy by limiting competition by ﬁrms from abroad.
However, free trade agreements are designed and aimed at prohibiting such behaviour.
Nevertheless countries can invoke informal trade barriers by introducing safety or health related
product standards ‘tailored’ to the home country industry. However, this was not happening to a
great extent during this crisis (see e.g. OECD (2010)). In general it seems that these arguments
do not deliver sufﬁcient satisfying answers to our question. For a recent discussion of these
arguments see e.g. chapter 3 in Van Ewijk and Teulings (2009) or Bricongne et al. (2009a,b).
Since there seems to be a lack of a standard theory that is able to explain such a relationship
between ﬁnancial markets and trade, we discuss mostly empirical observations in the following
subsections. However, there are also some theoretical results which we report that point towards
the possibility of an amplifying mechanism related to trade and ﬁnance. Looking at the existing
literature provides us further with the impression that the question about ﬁnancial effects on
trade has mostly concerned researchers in the recent past due to the developments during the
crisis 2007-2009. Many contributions we review are therefore working or discussion papers and
not peer reviewed journal articles.
To judge upon the contribution of the literature on the topic, we ﬁrst give a brief introduction
about ﬁnancial practices in international trade. This is helpful because it shows us the numerous
problems that exist in trade and which are all relevant when shocks on the capital market occur.
After this, we turn to the theoretical and empirical literature. Finally, we conclude this chapter
with a summary of the ﬁndings and how they might relate to CPB’s macro economic models.
5.1 Practices in Trade Related Finance
Trade brings about at least two major problems in connection with ﬁnance. Typically, the
exporter and the importer of a good or service are located in different countries with possibly
substantial differences in institutional, cultural and legal settings. Enforceability of contracts is a
particular cross border problem. Second, a substantial fraction of trade in goods take place via
shipment methods that consume time, time during which a good is unproductive or can not be
sold further by the importer in case of a missing future market.
Both problems give rise to a deviation from the assumption of perfect and complete markets
underlying many main stream economic models. They introduce the problems of uncertainty
and missing markets and are, as such, the source of inefﬁciencies. In trying to overcome these
problems, actors on ﬁnancial markets have developed instruments that aim at reducing these
sources of inefﬁciencies. The main constructs related to trade are letters of credit, international
factoring, trade lending and credit insurances. The letter of credit seems to be the most
frequently used instrument with a market share in developed countries of about 40%. All of the
54instruments introduce their own problems that link this section to the remainder of the document.
Below we give a brief overview about how these instruments work. Trade ﬁnance goes well
beyond pure credit lending. The most important additional aspect is uncertainty that is involved
in business with trading partners in other countries.
Letter of credit
The letter of credit is typically issued by the bank of the importer to give the exporter the needed
certainty to ship the product. The bank therein guarantees to pay a speciﬁed amount to the
exporter’s bank if conditions of the letter are fulﬁlled. Usually, these conditions contain the
documents related to the trade for shipment, insurance and landing but can be freely negotiated.
Thus, this instrument is aimed at reducing the risk and uncertainty to some degree. However, the
approval of trade is only by inspection of documents and not the physical good. Therefore, some
degree of uncertainty remains. Note also, the bank of the importer issues a guarantee which is to
some extent equivalent to a credit and might therefore be subject to collateral to be provided by
the importer. The instrument is not resolving the illiquidity problem of the good during shipment
directly but is sold in practice at a discount.
International factoring
To provide a solution to the illiquidity problem, international factoring agencies offer their
service. The exporter who has a ﬁnancial claim on the importer which he only will fulﬁl after he
obtained the good or service can sell his claim at a discount rate to the agency. Thus, the
exporter is instantaneously provided with liquidity for which he has to incur the costs of the
discount. If agreed so, this arrangement leaves the factoring agency with the solvency risks of
the importer which might be manifold. To cover that risk, factoring agencies typically make use
of trade insurances. They reﬁnance their operations usually on the capital market.
Trade lending
This also works at reducing the problems arising from illiquidity. It is however a traditional
credit provided by the exporter’s bank which is subject to the usual credit restrictions such as
collateral and additionally is affected by potentially higher risks do to trade as compared with
domestic sales.
Trade insurances
Trade insurances are typically not the business of banks but that of more traditional insurance
companies or public institutions. Within freely negotiable contracts the insurer can guarantee the
payment of a speciﬁc amount in case of a particular event. This might be insolvency of the
importer but can also cover e.g. political risks which might be relevant to speciﬁc countries.
Typical clients are international factoring agencies but in principle also the exporter can directly
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collateral provided by the importer. There is nothing like a standard as in case of the letters of
credit. Therefore these are just examples which are by far not exhausting. Insurances can be
offered by private insurances where the usual problems of insurance markets come into play, but
can also be provided by public institutions or a state as means or part of trade policy.
5.2 Theoretical arguments
The recent theoretical literature in trade emerging after the publication of Melitz (2003) stresses
extensively the role of heterogeneous ﬁrms. As this approach seems to be the new paradigm in
trade theory we focus our overview over theoretical arguments on the relation between trade and
ﬁnance on this class of models.
In Melitz (2003), ﬁrms differ with respect to their total factor productivity drawn from a
random distribution. In its very basic formulation, the model predicts that only ﬁrms with high
productivity choose to export to another market besides their domestic. The reason for this is
that ﬁrms have to incur a ﬁxed entry cost if they decide to supply a foreign market. Only for high
productivity ﬁrms it is possible to sell a quantity high enough to recover these ﬁxed cost. Since
its publication, many extensions of the model have been proposed in the literature. Also it seems
that the model when confronted with data does well in explaining trade patterns. Important for
this subsection are the contributions that deal with the role of credit constraints in the decision
making process for ﬁrms regarding their export behaviour.
In the model of Chaney (2005), ﬁrms have heterogeneous productivity and are faced with the
decision whether to export or not as in the original Melitz (2003) model. Additionally, they are
confronted with credit constraints that apply to the ﬁnancing possibilities of the ﬁxed cost that
have to be incurred before entering a market abroad. In a world without ﬁnancial frictions, any
ﬁrm that ﬁnds it proﬁtable to export could ﬁnance these ﬁxed cost. In the presence of credit
constraints this however, is not the case. In the model, ﬁrms can only borrow against their
domestic cash ﬂow and an exogenous liquidity supply which is supplied to the ﬁrm in a
stochastic manner. The predictions of the model are twofold, ﬁrst, some ﬁrms are excluded from
exporting due to credit constraints although they would export in a ﬁrst best world. Second, an
increase in the exogenous liquidity supply generally boosts trade. A special focus of the paper is
on real exchange rate movements. It is shown that an appreciation of the domestic currency has
both positive and negative effects on trade: First, it increases the value of domestic cash ﬂow,
and second, it decreases proﬁts from exporting. Thus, the effect of exchange rate movements is
ambiguous. More suggestive is a conjecture of the author for future research of a possible
ampliﬁcation mechanism through credit constraints. If a ﬁrm is able to export to one country,
this might give rise in an extended model to additional cash ﬂows making it possible to conquer
56another market and so forth. The mechanism could run if true, of course, also the other way
around.
Manova (2008) employs in principle also a Melitz (2003) type of model but in the more
stylised and less elaborate version of Helpman et al. (2008). The model aims at explaining
certain empirical trade patterns through credit constraints. Looking at trade data often reveals
that countries tend to concentrate trade among only a few other countries. A typical trade matrix
contains numerous zero entries29. As in Manova (2008), heterogeneous ﬁrms endogenously
choose whether to export or not; exporting demands incurring a ﬁxed cost. Finance of these
ﬁxed cost is subject to credit constraints given by the value of collateral determined by a fraction
of the ﬁxed costs which is meant to represent a tangible asset. Thus, contrary to Manova (2008),
the non-domestic activity serves as collateral.
The interesting result both models have in common is the occurrence of sudden stops in trade
at the ﬁrm level. Once the credit constraints passes by a certain threshold, a ﬁrm or even a sector
chooses not to trade at all. If however the ﬁrm is active in trade, its trading volume is identical to
the one that would be obtained in a world without trade frictions.
Raddatz (2010) proposes an interesting theoretical argument related to the ﬁnancial
accelerator. Trade partners might be seen as an extraordinary risk by lenders devaluing a ﬁrms
assets used as collateral. This might ﬁrst give rise to an ampliﬁcation mechanism as explained in
the chapter on the ﬁnancial accelerator. Second, ﬁrms have an extra incentive to cut back in trade
to forgo such a negative effect which might be a reason for a drastic drop in trade. This argument
gives way to consider further consequences when recalling the literature on endogenous credit
constraints in Chapter 3.1. Given the validity of this argument, trade insurances gain in
importance due to their nature of counteracting the potential of foreign trading partners in
devaluating collateral values.
In brief, theoretical models related to trade ﬁnance, especially with respect to heterogeneity,
come from recent contributions. It seems that the models are mostly applicable to trade lending
or normal credit lending, thus, insurance problems are not touched upon. However, the cited
papers give some interesting arguments. These are the two arguments related to a possible
feedback loop in trade in Chaney (2005) and Raddatz (2010) both of which give a direct
connection to the ﬁnancial accelerator.
29 A similar motivation drives the work in Muûls (2009) with a comparable model and comparable results.
575.3 Empirical observations
Anecdotal evidence
This type of evidence is as its name suggests not scientiﬁc approved evidence. Rather it is based
on expert’s opinions, informal surveys or other information. Typically no sophisticated
quantitative methods are applied to form conclusions.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC (2009)) conducted a survey among exporting
ﬁrms in several countries on trade ﬁnance conditions. According to their results there seems to
be on the one hand an increasing demand of trade ﬁnance during the crisis since less ﬁrms are
willing to trade on open account. On the other hand ﬁrms experience tighter conditions by
ﬁnancial institutions, higher costs and less ﬁnance volume. It seems not in order to report the
precise numbers as there is no information on the representativeness of the survey. The survey is
partly also less clear about how different instruments in trade ﬁnance were affected.
Dorsey (2009) and IMF (2009) report on a bank survey conducted by the IMF and the
Bankers Associations for Finance and Trade (BAFT) in 2008 in response to the drop in trade.
Increased cost for letters of credit since 2007 were reported by 70% and of trade lending by 90%
of respondents. The vast majority of responding banks sees the cause in increased reﬁnancing
cost and increased capital requirements. No information was given regarding the
representativeness of the survey respondents.
Auboin (2009a,b,c) stresses the role of trade ﬁnance since at least 80% of world trade relies
on some type of underlying ﬁnance agreement (number provided without source) and that in the
peak during the crisis the letter of credit spread (with respect to LIBOR) increased up to 500
basis points for some counter parties. According to the author, the trade ﬁnance shortage might
be responsible for up to 15% of trade drop (number according to World Bank calculations
without precise source).
Directly related to trade insurances, Jones (2010) gives an overview on their gained
importance during the recent past. Trade insurance is now an essential part in the course of
world trade. During the crisis, losses to insurers increased dramatically. The loss-ratio, i.e. the
ratio of losses to gross insurance premia raised from roughly 40% before 2008 to about 85% in
2008 and 2009. Total exposure to risk to all insurers was 1.8 trillion USD in 2008 and trade
volume insured was 2.6 trillion USD.
However, there is also anecdotal skepticism. Humphrey (2009) reports on a telephone survey
among horticulture and garments ﬁrms in sub-Saharan Africa. No evidence on trade ﬁnance
shortage was reported from the respondents. Almunia et al. (2010) are sceptic for a large role to
play by trade ﬁnance friction. They argue that programs involving public banks and institutions
providing different means of trade ﬁnance during and in the aftermath of the crisis render the
argument useless.
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Going beyond the just mentioned anecdotes, there are also quite a view more scientiﬁc studies
on the role trade ﬁnance. Studies at various levels of aggregation can be found in the literature
and we review them starting with the most aggregate ones.
Cheung and Guichard (2009) use time series data on world trade in an error correction
model. To account for trade ﬁnance the authors proxy by using three different measures. First,
the difference between the fraction of U.S. banks reporting a tightening and a loosening in credit
conditions, second, the spread of U.S. T-bills and third a ‘ﬁnancial stress’ indicator reﬂecting
both aforementioned aspects. The results are mixed, in some cases a signiﬁcant negative impact
of adverse ﬁnancial conditions is found. However, when controlling for things as vertical
integration of world production and recession synchronization effects, this signiﬁcance vanishes.
It should be noted that the measures of ﬁnancial conditions are quite general and rather
non-speciﬁc to trade. In a simulation, the authors calculate that the adverse ﬁnancial conditions
contribute to about 10 to 20% of the observed trade collapse.
Ronci (2005) looks at the problem from the country’s point of view by using panel data. The
measure or proxy for trade ﬁnance is short term outstanding U.S. Dollar debt associated with
trade as reported by the Bank of International Settlement. The panel comprises just 10 countries
over a period of 10 years. The results indicate that growth in the trade ﬁnance measure has a
signiﬁcant positive impact on the country’s export and import growth.
There are also several studies at the industry level which allow the authors to make use of
data with better quality. Raddatz (2010) uses sector data for 28 manufacturing industries in 44
countries from input-output tables from 1980 to 2004. He looks at sector pairs across and within
countries and in particular at their correlation in growth of value added and production. Through
the input-output construction each pair has one downstream sector which is the input sector.
Drawing on U.S. industry data, the author uses the downstream sector’s dependence on trade
ﬁnance and weights it by the input-output relationship to the upstream sector. He obtains in this
way a measure of ‘credit chain closeness’ between sectors. In numerous regressions this
measure turns out to be positively associated with the correlation of both industries growth in
value added and production. This study can provide us with indirect evidence on the importance
of trade ﬁnance for the synchronization of real sector activity. However, due to the intense data
manipulation in the study it is hard to quantify effects.
Levchenko et al. (2009) use import and export growth data for 450 U.S. sectors between mid
2008 and mid 2009. To account for trade ﬁnance the authors use two measures working as
proxies. Through aggregating ﬁrm level data from Compustat, they obtain two measures of trade
ﬁnance volume in each sector. In a simple OLS regression none of them turns out to be statistical
signiﬁcant. It seems obvious that the results might be subject to endogeneity problems and
reverse causality. Trade ﬁnance volume is the result of supply and demand and estimation is
subject to the well known problems of endogeneity of market outcomes. Iacovone and Zavacka
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for 81 industries in 21 countries over the period 1980-2006. Key variable is an interaction
variable of a country speciﬁc industry wide crisis dummy and an industry speciﬁc dependence
measure on external ﬁnance and tangible assets for the U.S. The idea behind the latter is to
assume that the U.S. variable is representative across countries. This assumption might also
derive from the fact that no comparable data are available across a large enough sample of
countries. By interacting these variables one obtains by construction a new variable that does not
suffer from reduced variation. The results indicate that the interaction term is a signiﬁcant
variable with a negative coefﬁcient. The authors conclude from this that the effect of a crisis on
export growth is ampliﬁed by the dependence on ﬁnance volume. This seems however
questionable since such a conclusion would demand the crisis dummy to be included in a
regression also separately. This is however not possible due to the low variation problem as the
crisis dummy is deﬁned as indicating industry wide crises. It seems therefore questionable in
how far the results are reliable. In a similar vain Manova (2008) analyses also a panel of 27
industries in 107 countries over the period 1985-1995. He also uses the dependence on external
ﬁnance measures for the U.S. industries and interact them with a country speciﬁc measure of
ﬁnancial development which is given by the ratio of private debt to GDP. A signiﬁcant positive
effect of ﬁnancial development on trade is found. Chor and Manova (2010) examine a cross
country industry panel for 2006 to 2009 of exports to the U.S. Finance conditions for exporters is
proxied by the applicable interbank rate in the respective country and is common for all sectors
in that country. Sector exposure to ﬁnancial conditions is as in Manova (2008) measured by U.S.
industry data. The explanatory variable which is used in the regression is then the interaction
between the two measures. The main results indicate that tougher credit conditions and higher
ﬁnancial exposure is affecting U.S. import negatively. However, the same caveats apply as
before. Exposure is measured by U.S. data alone, additionally ﬁnance conditions are proxied by
a country’s interbank rate which is clearly not representing trade ﬁnance conditions but is more
general. Eaton et al. (2010) use the approach of business cycle accounting of Chari et al. (2007)
and combine it with a general equilibrium trade model. The authors aim at a decomposition of
the trade effects during the crisis 2007-2009 for U.S. imports and exports. Their main ﬁndings is
not supportive for ﬁnance as the primary source of the drop in trade. Rather the results indicate
that a combination of trade composition and demand effects is largely responsible.
At an even lower level of aggregation, we ﬁnd quite some ﬁrm level studies that deal with our
general question. Amiti and Weinstein (2009) use matched Japanese ﬁrm-bank data for the
ﬁrm’s trade behaviour and the ‘health’ of their banks during the crisis in the 1990s. Their sample
covers about 700 manufacturing ﬁrms responsible for 80% of good exports. Their main
argument relies on the necessity of exporters to ﬁnance their shipments. The key variable in the
study is the measure of ‘bank health’ which is the yearly change in the bank’s market-to-book
value reﬂecting the market’s judgement on the bank. Aggregating over ﬁrms in the sample, the
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amount of trade ﬁnance supplied by them. Second, they ﬁnd exports to be positively correlated
with the volume of trade ﬁnance. Going beyond pure correlations, their estimates reveal that
ﬁrms’ export growth is affected by one year lagged change in their bank’s health. Through
robustness checks with additional variables and different estimation techniques, the authors
conclude that they uncovered a causal relationship which is able to explain about 30% of the
decline in trade during the crisis.
Muûls (2009) tries to test the hypothesis obtained from a Melitz (2003) type of model using a
ﬁrm data set for Belgium. As a measure for external ﬁnance the author uses a ﬁrm’s credit
worthiness score which is not necessarily trade related. In different regression exercises the
following results are obtained. First, a favourable credit score in the past increases the ﬁrm’s
probability to be an exporter to date, second, a favourable credit score increases the number of
export destinations. Furthermore, it is empirically shown that exporter ﬁrst serve large and easy
to access markets and with increasing access to external ﬁnance, i.e. a favourable credit score, go
further in serving smaller markets.
Finally, Greenaway et al. (2007) use panel data on UK manufacturing ﬁrms for the time
period of 1993 to 2003. Evidence for the role of credit constraints in exporting is indirect. The
authors show that the decision to export is positively inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s ratio of assets to
liabilities and negatively by short term debt to assets. Looking at the way the ﬁnancial
accelerator has found its way into DSGE models, we remember a similarity as the ﬁrms net
worth to capital ratio was an important variable there.
There are a limited number of studies on the particular instrument of trade insurances which
gained considerably in importance during the recent past. Egger and Url (2006) and Moser et al.
(2008) estimate the effect of public trade insurances on exports for Austrian and German
exporters respectively. They ﬁnd a statistical and economical signiﬁcant relationship with a
(local) multiplier based on a constant elasticity in the order of 2.8 and 1.7. These numbers are to
be interpreted in unit levels, i.e. an increase of publicly insured exports of 1 Euro increases total
exports by 2.8 and 1.7 Euro respectively. A recent and important study by Van der Veer (2010) is
concerned with quantifying the impact of private trade insurances on total exports. This study is
even more important than the two aforementioned since public trade insurances where
considerably reduced in most developed countries in order to foster the private insurance market.
In a panel of 25 mostly OECD countries, the author ﬁnds a multiplier of the order 2.3 in the
short run. The rather high multipliers might be suspicious, however, they ﬁt quite well into the
theory developed in the above cited Melitz (2003) models. These models have a threshold effect
in common, i.e. a certain level of ﬁnancing ability has to surpassed for a foreign market to be
served. This gives rise to a non-linearity which can be seen to reﬂected by the above multipliers.
As mentioned above, insurances might help in reducing risks through foreign trading partners
that might negatively inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s collateral values.
615.4 Relation to CPB models
In Chapter 3 on the ﬁnancial accelerator we were able to formulate ideas on how to implement
the mechanism in a quite concrete manner into CPB’s macro models. This was due to at least
some common agreement in the literature on how the ampliﬁcation mechanism is to be
implemented in macro economic models. Regarding trade and ﬁnance, this seems to be not as
straightforward. Particular ideas have sound economic intuition or foundation but are not
formally developed. Empirical effects are observable but to quite some extent based on proxy
measures and additionally might apply only to micro economic settings. An exception might be
the recent evidence for trade insurances, however, this is only one aspect of trade ﬁnance. By
drawing on the existing literature alone, a clear picture for an application in macro economic
models does not emerge. There is need for further research in order to develop a formal structure
that could be implemented in CPB’s models. The importance of trade for The Netherlands
strongly encourages this.
5.5 Assessment
At ﬁrst sight, the empirical literature seems to be a little bit disappointing given the question we
post at the outset. There seems to be no clear answer why we have observed such a dramatic fall
in trade during the crisis 2007-2009. What can be read off from the literature is that there is
likely to be a relation between ﬁnance and trade. However, it seems less clear how to draw
inference about the precise pattern of this relationship. Also the literature does not look in detail
into the different trade ﬁnance instruments explained above. The measures used are more or less
proxies that can be associated with trade ﬁnance in general but not a speciﬁc instrument. As such
we are not able to distinguish between bank or insurance related problems that led to the
observed pattern.
Aggregate studies suffer most from the possibility of biased estimates. These can be due to
endogeneity of the independent variables or reverse causality. The exception might be the study
of Raddatz (2010) which is done in a sophisticated manner but gives us just indirect evidence on
ﬁnancial effects on trade. Although also not distinguishing between the various aspects of trade
ﬁnance, the literature using ﬁrm level data seems to be more promising. First, such studies can
usually draw on higher quality data. Second, they also seem to be on a track closely related to
our initial question. It is the sudden stop of trade or a non-linear behaviour of ﬁrms in reaction to
changes in ﬁnancial constraints which seems to be supported by the data. However, we have also
to be aware of the fact that they provide micro economic evidence and whether the effects carry
over to the aggregate remains an open question.
Another aspect concerns the use of proxies or measures for trade ﬁnance in the above cited
studies. It limits the possibilities of quantifying effects. It might well be possible to calculate
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(2009). It is however unclear how a speciﬁc shock to the economy and its ﬁnancial system
affects this credit score. We are therefore not in the same position as with quantifying the
magnitude of the ﬁnancial accelerator where the literature has developed a more common
speciﬁcation. These critics apply to a lesser extent to the empirical ﬁndings for the effect of trade
insurances. But, as said before, this is just one aspect of trade ﬁnance.
If we were to draw a clear conclusion form the empirical literature, it would read as follows.
There seems to be an inﬂuence of a real effect of ﬁnance on trade and there is some evidence for
possible non-linearities. Future research has, however, to be done to quantify them. Also
possible feedback loops proposed in the theoretical literature should be investigated. There has
to be additional research on the quantitative effects of particular trade ﬁnance instruments.
As already mentioned, the importance of trade for The Netherlands strongly suggests to
devote more effort on this issue. What the preceding literature review made clear is that there
does not exist something as a standard approach for relation between trade and ﬁnance. Given
this, the opportunity could be taken to work on this in a way that is suitable to produce results
that are compatible with CPB’s macro models. Another route for further research could be the
issue of ﬁnancial ﬂows, ﬁnancial markets and the real economy. Modern production methods
imply highly diversiﬁed supply chains with corresponding investments in different countries.
Also these investments are inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial shocks and inﬂuence real economic activity.
63646 Risk Channels
Financial crises boost asset return risk. Figure 6.1 presents the Chicago Board Options Exchange
Volatility Index (VIX) over the period 2/1/1990–17/8/2010. The VIX is a measure of the
expected volatility of the S&P 500 index as derived from the Black-Scholes formula. The
ﬁnancial crises of the past two decades correspond well with the spikes in the VIX (see
González-Hermosillo and Hesse (2009) for a dating method that distinguishes periods of high ex
ante risk).30 The ﬁgure also shows that expected volatility is skewed to the right, with strong
positive peaks occurring mainly at times of negative shocks and few, if any, negative peaks.





























Financial crises affect not just asset return risk, but also other macroeconomic risks, like GDP
risk and productivity risk. These risks are related. The output loss associated with crises must be
reﬂected in equity prices. In the absence of a separate return risk, asset price shocks should still
occur, depending on the shocks in productivity, labour supply, etc. However, it turns out that
asset price volatility cannot be explained from other risk factors such as productivity risk. E.g., it
appears that most of the volatility spikes in Figure 6.1 do not relate to other macroeconomic risk
factors (see Section 6.3 below).
30 Not all ﬁnancial crises generate increased volatility, however. E.g. the 1992-93 EMS crisis cannot be read back from the
VIX volatility index.
65Return risk is an important determinant of investment decisions for ﬁrms and saving decisions
for households. The question that will occupy us in this chapter is how changes in expected risk
affect real economic activity, including the ‘procyclicality’ of risk. If higher return risk boosts
risk premia, higher risk premia depress real activity, and a recession boosts risk premia, a
positive feedback channel arises that ampliﬁes the initial shock to return risk.
A positive relation between asset return risk and risk premia is not evident from the data on
realized returns. Black (1976) showed that changes in volatility are negatively correlated with
excess returns, so that low returns coincide with high volatility and vice versa. The same
conclusion holds for returns and expected volatility, as measured by the VIX index (Fleming
et al., 1995). This ﬁnding raises two questions: what causes volatility changes, and how do
volatility changes affect the price of risk?
6.1 Volatility
It is well known that the volatility of asset returns is highly persistent (Cont, 2001). This implies
that volatility is predictable. Most volatility forecast methods use the autocorrelation properties
of (nonlinear transformations of) the returns (see Poon and Granger, 2003; Andersen et al., 2006,
for surveys of volatility forecasting models).31 The literature on the determinants of volatility is
much thinner on the ground and not very conclusive. Christie (1982) ﬁnds a strong effect of
leverage and interest rates on volatility, which supports Black’s ‘leverage’ hypothesis: a fall in
stock prices boosts the leverage of the ﬁrm, which increases the volatility of the ﬁrm’s market
value. However, Schwert (1989) ﬁnds that a recession dummy is the only variable which is
consistently signiﬁcant. Financial leverage is signiﬁcant only if no other variables are included
in the regression. Schwert concludes that there exists a ‘volatility puzzle.’ Like Christie, Glosten
et al. (1993) ﬁnd that the nominal risk-free rate has a signiﬁcant positive effect on volatility.
Instead of interest rates, Whitelaw (1994) uses the spread between the treasure bill rate and the
commercial paper rate as a determinant of expected volatility, which also appears to be
signiﬁcant. Hamilton and Lin (1996) formulate a joint time series model for industrial
production and volatility in which a recession is a hidden state variable that follows a Markov
transition process. The results conﬁrm the conclusions of Schwert with respect to the importance
of recessions for equity return volatility. The recession state explains over 60% of the variance of
stock returns.
Flannery and Protopapakakis (2002) use an extensive data set of announcements (‘news’) to
ﬁnd determinants of equity returns and volatility. They ﬁnd that monetary expansion (M1), trade
balance, employment, and housing starts affect volatility in a GARCH(1,1) speciﬁcation.
31 The return on good volatility forecasts is non-negligible. Fleming et al. (2001, 2003) analyse the economic value of
volatility timing in portfolio allocation. They ﬁnd that the annual return value of taking daily volatility into account is up to
200 basis points.
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days. For Europe, Errunza and Hogan (1998) also report that macroeconomic factors do affect
stock volatility, in particular money supply boosts volatility in Germany and France, and
industrial production volatility Granger causes volatility in Italy and the Netherlands. Konrad
(2009) also ﬁnds a signiﬁcant effect of monetary policy on asset return volatility in Germany.
Ludvigson and Ng (2007) use a dynamic factor analysis to construct determinants of volatility
and excess returns from a wide range of variables. They obtain two factors from ﬁnancial
indicators, a ‘volatility factor’ that explains the larger part of volatility, and a ‘risk premium’
factor, used to predict risk premia (in conjunction with the consumption-wealth ratio, cf. Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001)). A third ‘real’ factor from macroeconomic indicators correlated with
output and employment also helps explaining volatility.
Asymmetry in the effect of excess return shocks on expected volatility has been investigated
in a number of papers. The general ﬁnding is that negative return shocks create considerably
more volatility than positive shocks. see e.g. Nelson (1991); Glosten et al. (1993); Bollerslev
et al. (1994), and the survey in Table 1 of Bekaert and Wu (2000).
6.2 Volatility and Risk Premia
The observation of Black (1976) that volatility and excess returns are negatively correlated
generated a fair amount of debate. Black suggested that the causal relation runs from excess
returns to volatility. French et al. (1987) point out that the observed correlation between
volatility and return consists of two components, a positive relation between the expected excess
return and expected volatility, and a negative relation between the actual excess return and
realised volatility. An unexpected, persistent, increase in volatility will initially lower excess
returns, due to the effect of a higher risk premium on asset prices, and afterwards, on average,
lead to an increase in excess returns. French et al. (1987) and Bollerslev et al. (1988) model this
relation in terms of a GARCH-m process, in which the conditional expected return is a function
of volatility. They ﬁnd a positive relation between predicted volatility and expected excess
returns. Generally, the relative size of the effect depends on the persistence in volatility. French
et al. obtain a mean lag in volatility of about 12 months and Bollerslev et al. of about 2 quarters.
The positive relation between expected returns and expected volatility is not found in all
studies, however. E.g. Nelson (1991); Glosten et al. (1993) obtain a negative effect of expected
volatility on excess returns in their GARCH-m speciﬁcation.32 The diversity of results obtained
from GARCH-m models suggests that the relation between expected returns and volatility may
be more complicated than what can be captured in a single coefﬁcient. E.g. Whitelaw (1994)
32 Backus and Gregory (1993) provide numerical examples that show that, theoretically, a positive relation between
expected volatility and expected returns need not exist.
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changes sign after three months and peaks after eight months. That is, the structure of the
CAPM, with its invariant relation between risk premia and risk, appears to be too restrictive.
Parametric speciﬁcations of volatility condition volatility in terms of a small number of
observable variables, and the particular assumptions used appear to affect the results. A more
general approach is to model the variance as a latent stochastic process (Andersen et al., 2006,
section 4). Brandt and Kang (2004) model both conditional returns and conditional volatility as
latent state variables. They ﬁnd a positive effect of volatility innovations on expected returns, as
well as a negative effect of returns innovations on expected volatility. The general shape of the
response functions corresponds well with those in Whitelaw, including the peak in expected
returns eight months after a volatility shock (0.5% for a volatility shock of 5%). Ghysels et al.
(2005) improve on the standard GARCH-m model by using daily stock returns to measure
volatility and by estimating the optimal data window length along with the return process. They
too obtain a positive relation between expected excess returns and expected volatility. Ludvigson
and Ng (2007) use factor analysis to circumvent the restrictions of parametric models. They ﬁnd
a positive relation between the conditional mean return and the change in conditional volatility,
with a coefﬁcient of about 1.4 for quarterly returns and volatility, so that a one percentage point
increase in volatility boosts expected returns by about 1.4%
The behaviour of risk premia during banking crises may deviate from the general pattern
over the standard business cycle on account of the different role of ﬁnancial intermediaries. He
and Krishnamurthy (2008a) discuss a model in which the marginal investor is a ﬁnancial
intermediary. Intermediaries face a constraint on raising equity capital. When the constraint
binds, so that intermediaries’ equity capital is scarce, risk premia rise to reﬂect the capital
scarcity. Adrian and Shin (2010) also explore the hypothesis that ﬁnancial intermediaries drive
the business cycle by way of their role in determining the price of risk. In this ‘risk-taking
channel’ of monetary policy, balance sheet quantities emerge as a key indicator of risk bearing
capacity. Adrian and Shin present evidence that the balance sheets of ﬁnancial intermediaries
reﬂect the transmission of monetary policy through capital market conditions. It points to the
importance of short-term interest rates in inﬂuencing the size of ﬁnancial intermediary balance
sheets.
6.2.1 The Price of Risk
A useful summary measure of the relation between volatility and risk premia is the price of risk
deﬁned as the ex ante, or conditional, Sharpe ratio, which is deﬁned as the expected excess
return of an asset over the safe return, divided by the expected standard deviation of this excess
return.33 Part of the appeal of the Sharpe ratio is that in the standard CAPM the price of risk is a
33 With multiple risk factors, the price of risk is also a vector.
68constant. Going beyond the CAPM, asset pricing theory gives the following expression for the









where R denotes the asset return, R f the risk-free return, st(Rt+1) the expected volatility of the
return, m is the stochastic discount rate of the investor, and r(m;R) denotes the correlation
between the stochastic discount rate and the return to the asset. The price of risk is high if
consumption risk is high (s(m), R f), or if low asset returns coincide with bad times (r(m;R)).
For a given price of risk, the expected excess asset return varies in proportion to the expected
return risk on the asset. A boost in expected volatility should therefore result in a corresponding
increase in the risk premium of the asset, unless the price of risk falls. This cannot be excluded a
priori, e.g. a substantial fall in the safe rate may occur due to a ‘ﬂight to safety.’
The price of risk can be estimated parametrically from (6.1) by modelling the stochastic
discount rate m. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) use a consumption-based asset pricing model
with habit formation to explain excess stock returns. They ﬁnd that the price of risk is strongly
countercyclical, as stocks do poorly at times where consumption is low. The Campbell and
Cochrane model is rather restrictive in the number of risk factors, as it uses only consumption
risk. However, Bansal and Yaron (2004) obtain similar conclusions, using dividend growth as an
additional risk factor. Wachter (2006) extends the Campbell-Cochrane model by introducing
inﬂation risk and modelling the bond term structure. This does not affect the conclusions with
respect to the countercyclical price of risk either.
Alternatively, stochastic volatility models may be used to estimate the price of risk with less
restrictions imposed. Brandt and Kang (2004), using a latent variable approach, ﬁnd that the
conditional Sharpe ratio falls on impact in response to an innovation in volatility and becomes
positive after seven months. Whitelaw (1997), Ludvigson and Ng (2007) and Lettau and
Ludvigson (2009) estimate the price of risk for equity by using predicted excess returns and
predicted volatility to construct a conditional Sharpe ratio, based on a number of risk factors.
Whitelaw obtains a strongly time-dependent conditional Sharpe ratio, that varies between -0.4
and 1.1.34 The estimates presented by Ludvigson and Ng (2007) and Lettau and Ludvigson
(2009) also indicate a volatile price of risk, that is strongly countercyclical, and varies between
-0.8 and 2. The price of risk rises substantially during most recessions, and on average falls again
during expansions, although the pattern during expansions is less clear than during recessions.
34 Negative conditional Sharpe ratios are an artifact of the linear estimators of expected returns and expected volatility
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Utility-based structural models like that of Campbell and Cochrane cannot match the volatility
of the price of risk. The empirically oriented risk pricing models of Ludvigson and Ng (2007)
and others are able to explain risk premia in terms of fundamentals plus a ‘volatility risk’ factor.
However, the nature of this factor remains obscure. Section 6.1 above pointed out that volatility
can be partly explained from fundamentals, but that a large part of volatility variation remains
unexplained. In particular, it is difﬁcult to explain the volatility spikes associated with ﬁnancial
crises from fundamentals. E.g., ﬁgure 6 in Ludvigson and Ng (2007) shows that all of the spikes
associated with ﬁnancial crises in the nineties (cf. Figure 6.1) are missed by the predicted series.
It appears that ﬁnancial crises are a separate risk factor, that cannot be traced back to underlying
causes. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is a coordination failure of expectations of
market participants. Indeed, several papers analyse spikes in market risk in terms of a
coordination failure, or ‘risk panic.’
Townsend (1983) analyses the consequences of an environment were agents have to forecast
other agents’ forecasts. Agents therefore need to infer other agents’ beliefs via Bayesian
learning. He ﬁnds that forecast errors are serially correlated across agents, and also serially
correlated over time. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) use Bayesian learning in a context where
individual agents’ information signals are noisy. In this case, observed behaviour of a sufﬁciently
large number of agents may lead agents to discard their own private information in their
decisions. The consequence is that in an information cascade new market signals no longer affect
agents’ decisions, which may lead to multiple equilibria. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001)
survey the implications of this idea for ﬁnancial markets. They conclude that in developed,
transparent, ﬁnancial markets the probability of an informational cascade is not very high.
Information coordination failures may easily arise in a situation where there is true Knightian
uncertainty. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) present a model of crises and central bank
policy that incorporates Knightian uncertainty. Severe ﬂight-to-quality episodes involve
uncertainty about the environment, not just risk about asset payoffs. The uncertainty is triggered
by unusual events and untested ﬁnancial innovations that lead agents to question their world
view. The model explains crisis regularities such as market-wide capital immobility, agents’
disengagement from risk, and liquidity hoarding. Krishnamurthy (2010) describes two
ampliﬁcations mechanisms that operate during crises and discuss the beneﬁts of policy,
conditional on either mechanism. The ﬁrst mechanism involves asset prices and balance sheets.
A negative shock to agents’ balance sheets causes them to liquidate assets, lowering prices,
further deteriorating balance sheets and amplifying the shock. The second mechanism involves
investors’ Knightian uncertainty. Unusual shocks to untested ﬁnancial innovations increase
agents’ uncertainty about their investments, causing them to disengage from markets and
amplifying the crisis. Liquidity provision by the central bank alleviates the crisis in both
70mechanisms. Bacchetta et al. (2010) propose an explanation for spikes in asset price risk based
on self-fulﬁlling shifts in risk perception, made possible by a negative link between the current
asset price and risk about the future asset price.
6.4 Households
How do consumption and investment of risk-averse agents respond to an increase in risk?
Economic theory does not put any ﬁrm restrictions on behaviour in this respect. First, risk
aversion does not have any implications for optimal behaviour. If agents have quadratic utility,
risk doesn’t affect their behaviour at all. Second, in a setting of complete markets,
consumption/saving decisions and investment decisions are the same. All households use the
same discount rates of future uncertain income, so the ownership of ﬁrms is not an issue. In a
world of incomplete markets, there is no shareholder unanimity and investment decisions of
ﬁrms do not in general derive from the same objective function as saving decisions of households
(Magill and Quinzii, 1996, Chapter 6). Below, we discuss the effects of risk on household
behaviour. The effects of risk on investment in productive assets is discussed in Section 6.5.
Leland (1968) pointed out that the degree to which households’ behaviour responds to
changes in risk depends on the slope of marginal utility of consumption. Precautionary
behaviour, in which an increase in risk boosts household saving, occurs only if marginal utility is
convex in consumption. In analogy to the Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion (Pratt, 1964),
Kimball (1990) deﬁnes the degree of prudence as a measure of the sensitivity of the agents
decision (saving) with respect to the risk factor involved (per unit of variance). The
precautionary premium then gives the absolute or relative reduction in the risk factor (e.g.
income) that would induce the agent to take the same decision as in the absence of risk.35 In the
CRRA case, prudence and risk aversion are directly related, the coefﬁcient of relative prudence
equals one plus the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion.
Zeldes (1989) shows numerically for a life cycle model with CRRA utility that income
uncertainty leads to a strongly nonlinear relation between consumption and ﬁnancial wealth: at
low wealth levels consumption is low, but the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is
high, and vice versa at high levels of wealth. In combination with a positive time preference,
Carroll (1997) shows that this implies that at low wealth, consumption grows relatively fast,
while at high levels of wealth consumption grows slowly. The wealth level at which expected
wealth growth is zero, is the ‘buffer stock.’ Thus household saving may be characterised as
buffer stock saving: households try to maintain a target level of wealth, and near the buffer stock
of wealth consumption corresponds closely to income. The level of the buffer stock depends a.o.
35 A prudent household therefore reacts to income uncertainty by choosing a consumption level that corresponds to an
income level under certainty that is lowered by the precautionary premium.
71on income uncertainty. With higher income uncertainty, next period’s expected marginal utility
rises, and consumption falls until a new, higher, buffer stock level is attained.
It appears that, empirically, saving of young to middle-aged households can be characterised
as buffer stock saving. Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Cagetti (2003) estimate life cycle
models with relatively high time preference rates and moderate rates of risk aversion. The buffer
stock saving motive is active primarily over the ﬁrst half of households’ working life, at a stage
when the households has a rising wage proﬁle and would therefore, without income uncertainty,
have liked to borrow against future income. Instead, they hold a few months of income as
precautionary wealth. From their late forties on, households accumulate more wealth and as a
result start to behave like a ‘standard’ life cycle household, with a constant, low, propensity to
consume out of wealth and transitory income.
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Carroll and Samwick (1997) show that
income uncertainty has a strongly signiﬁcant positive effect on household wealth for households
under 50, in agreement with the buffer stock model. Carroll and Samwick (1998) compute the
relative importance of precautionary wealth in total wealth. First they provide numerical
evidence that the theoretical relation between saving and income uncertainty is well
approximated by a linear relationship between the wealth-income ratio and the variance of the
log of income. Next, they estimate the relation between income variance and the wealth-income
ratio from the PSID and obtain a coefﬁcient of around 0.5, implying that a doubling of the
standard deviation of log income approximately doubles the target buffer stock as well, i.e. adds
several months of wages to target wealth. Carroll and Samwick estimate that a reduction of
income uncertainty of all household groups to match the uncertainty of the group with the lowest
uncertainty would reduce asset holding by between 45%.
For young households, income risk is to a large extent labour income risk. Carroll et al.
(2003) use unemployment risk as a measure of uncertainty. They ﬁnd a relation between
precautionary wealth and unemployment risk for medium- and high-income households.
Low-income households show no saving response to variations in unemployment risk.36 In
addition, precautionary wealth holding is not observed if housing wealth is excluded, which is
surprising in view of the low liquidity of housing wealth.
Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) use responses to direct questions about desired precautionary
wealth from the Survey of Consumer Finances to assess the importance of precautionary
motives. They ﬁnd that most households save partly for precautionary reasons. On average,
desired precautionary wealth is about 20% of total ﬁnancial wealth in the US. Stated
precautionary motives are especially strong for older households and business owners. This
36 This may be related to the observation that high-income households in the U.S. face far greater income risk than
low-income households, see Parker and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009)
72indicates that other risks besides income risk (e.g. health care) should be taken into account
when investigating saving motives.
The theoretical link between the consumption-wealth ratio and risk premia is conﬁrmed by
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), who show that the consumption-wealth ratio forecasts both stock
returns and dividend growth at horizons as short as one quarter.37;38 The consumption-wealth
ratio therefore contains information about discount that is independent of the price-dividend
ratio. In addition, the consumption-wealth ratio outperforms the price-dividend ratio at periods
of up to four years.
6.5 Firms
Firms are owned by households. A fully general treatment of the effects of risk on economic
agents would not therefore make any distinction between households and ﬁrms.39 For prudent
investors, the expected stochastic discount rate rises in times of greater income risk. The issue is
what happens to the covariance with the expected return to investment. The discussion in
Section 6.2 indicates that empirically the probable effect of an increase in return volatility for an
investor is to raise the discount rate of future investment returns. In addition, the price of risk
may also rise, further boosting discount rates. This leads to a hike in the cost of capital and a fall
of the desired capital stock.40
Still, it is useful to discuss the impact of risk on ﬁrms separately. First, with incomplete
markets it is difﬁcult to link the discount rate of the ﬁrm to a representative investor. This is
particularly relevant in the case of risks that cannot be traded (like the risk of a ﬁnancial crisis),
but the problem is more general, as most households do not trade in the stock market, so that the
representative household is different from the representative investor (cf. Mankiw and Zeldes,
1991). In particular, the representative investor is both a lot richer than the representative
consumer, and therefore less susceptible to precautionary motives. Also, investors are less
risk-averse than the average household and have more ‘conﬁdence’ in future economic
conditions. Second, decisions taken in a production environment often face different constraints
from those of a portfolio investor. E.g., productive investments are often irreversible, hiring and
37 Lettau and Ludvigson construct a proxy for human wealth based on current labour income, assuming that the return on
human wealth is a stationary process.
38 The estimates suggest that a 1% increase in the consumption-wealth ratio boosts predicted excess returns by 5% over
a 1-year horizon, or 7% over a two-year interval.
39 Write the arbitrage equation for the market valueV of a ﬁrm as 1+rt+1 =Vt+1=(Vt  Dt), where r is the rate of return,
and D are the net dividend payments. The optimal investment equation is equivalent to the portfolio equation







40 Theoretically, this conclusion is not unavoidable because of the potential offsetting effects of portfolio adjustments, cf.
Backus and Gregory (1993).
73ﬁring of workers is subject to frictions, etc. In these cases risk has an effect on investment even if
the investor is risk-neutral.
In the next two sections, we discuss the effect of risk on investment and employment
decisions for a risk-neutral investor.
6.5.1 Investment in Productive Assets
An early survey of the effects of risk on the decisions of ﬁrms is Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971).
Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983, 1984) were the ﬁrst to apply the concepts expounded by
Rothschild and Stiglitz to the dynamic problem of investment. They both examine the effect of
price uncertainty on the investment decision of a risk-neutral competitive ﬁrm. Hartman showed
that with a linearly homogeneous production function, increased output price uncertainty leads
the competitive ﬁrm to increase its investment. Abel demonstrated that Hartman’s results
continue to hold in a continuous-time setting with a mean-reverting price process and in the
presence of adjustment costs. The basic intuition for this result is that because of short-run
decreasing returns to scale, the revenue function is a convex function of price: at lower output
prices the ﬁrm contracts and proﬁts don’t fall much, whereas at high prices the ﬁrm expands and
proﬁts go up more than proportionally.
The result that increased risk boosts investment for a risk-neutral ﬁrm depends on a number
of assumption. First, for risk-averse investors there are two counteracting forces at work, and
Zeira (1990) shows that the net outcome may go either way. Second, the assumptions of perfect
competition and long-run constant returns to scale are essential. Pindyck (1988) investigates the
consequences of irreversibility of investment for a ﬁrm that is subject to price uncertainty and is
subject to a decreasing returns production technology and a demand schedule. In this case the
investment decision has an option value that increases with price uncertainty. As a result the ﬁrm
postpones investment and invests only if the price exceeds a threshold value. The net effect of
demand uncertainty is that it leads to a lower optimal capital stock.
Caballero (1991) shows that the difference in results between Hartman/Abel and Pindyck
derives not only from the nature of the adjustment cost function, but also from the assumptions
of perfect competition and constant returns versus imperfect competition and decreasing returns.
Irreversibility does not alter Hartman and Abel’s conclusions if markets are perfectly competitive
and free entry prevails, as there is no option value of waiting. In reply, Pindyck (1993) argues
that the problem setting of Caballero is not useful to study industry equilibrium, and that if
industry faces a downward sloping demand curve, the conclusions of Pindyck (1988) still hold.
The model of asymmetric (downward) adjustment costs and decreasing returns generates
lumpy investment at the level of the individual ﬁrm, a feature that is not observed in aggregate
investment. Bertola and Caballero (1994) characterize the aggregate implications of
microeconomic irreversibility and idiosyncratic uncertainty. It appears that with sufﬁcient
idiosyncratic uncertainty, the dynamics of aggregate investment can be matched to U.S. data
74without assuming convex adjustment costs. The idiosyncratic shocks generate a capacity
distribution and at any given time only the subset of ﬁrms with capacity below the threshold will
invest. At the macro level, the implication is that aggregate level investment adjusts more
sluggishly to e.g. demand shocks the larger idiosyncratic uncertainty. Compared to the reversible
investment case, the capital stock is smaller at the points in time at which the ﬁrm invests.41
In terms of a general volatility spike, this model predicts an increase in the gap between the
actual and desired capital stock for most ﬁrms, and a consequent fall in investment. As long as
the high risk persists, investment will be smoother in response to variations in business
conditions. However, the capital stock will gradually recover, and eventually exceed its original
level, as a larger percentage of ﬁrms faces excess capacity (that is, with risk-neutral investors).
Bloom et al. (2007) show that with (partial) irreversibility higher uncertainty reduces the
responsiveness of investment to demand shocks. Uncertainty increases real option values
making ﬁrms more cautious when investing or disinvesting. This is conﬁrmed both numerically
for a model with a mix of adjustment costs, time-varying uncertainty, and aggregation over
investment decisions and time and also empirically for a panel of manufacturing ﬁrms.
Miao and Wang (2007) analyse the consequences of undiversiﬁable idiosyncratic risk of the
investment project for the investment timing decision. In this case, the standard real options
approach fails, and if the agent is not risk-neutral, precautionary motives enter that may induce
the entrepreneur to invest early. This effect is strongest if the entrepreneur can sell her project
once the investment is in place, because it allows the investor to exit the incomplete market of
project development. If the idiosyncratic risk of the revenue stream from the project cannot be
sold, the value of the project diminishes, which works the other way, so that the net effect is
ambiguous. Gryglewicz et al. (2008) investigate the effects of the expected useful life of an
investment. If a project is short-lived, increased uncertainty may speed up the implementation
date of the project.
6.5.2 Empirics of Investment and Risk
The empirical literature on the effects of uncertainty on investment is extensive.42 Uncertainty
measures include exchange rate risk (Goldberg, 1993; Campa and Goldberg, 1995; Bell and
Campa, 1997), price volatility and inﬂation (Driver and Moreton, 1991; Huizinga, 1993; Ghosal
and Loungani, 1996; Bell and Campa, 1997; Beaudry et al., 2001), the term structure of interest
rates (Ferderer, 1993), demand uncertainty (Bell and Campa, 1997; Guiso and Parigi, 1999), and
stock market volatility (Leahy and Whited, 1996; Baum et al., 2009). Some studies simply take
41 Abel and Eberly (1999) discuss the effects of idiosyncratic uncertainty on the expected size of the capital stock in the
presence of irreversible investment. Two forces are at work on the capital stock: the option value of waiting lowers the
investment incentive, while the ‘hangover’ effect prevents the ﬁrm from selling off capital in case of excess capacity. There
will therefore always be a fraction of ﬁrms with excess capacity. It appears that in the long run, an increase in uncertainty
will lead to a higher average capital stock due to the hangover effect.
42 Carruth et al. (2000) present a survey of the literature of the effects of uncertainty on investment up to 1996.
75realized volatility as a measure of risk, but most use forecasted volatility (see Section 6.1). Guiso
and Parigi use survey data to measure demand uncertainty, while Baum et al. use high-frequency
stock market data.
Lettau and Ludvigson (2002) ﬁnd indirect conﬁrmation of the effect of risk on investment. If
there is a term structure in the equity premium, investment in long-lived ﬁxed assets should
depend more on future equity premia than the current expected excess returns. Lettau and
Ludvigson show that the consumption-wealth ratio predicts both future excess returns and future
investment. The interpretation of this ﬁnding is that if the current consumption-wealth ratio is
above normal, wealth holdings of most households must be below their target buffer stock
wealth. Most households therefore have a high discount rate, so the equity premium must be
high. Because the equity premium is mean-reverting, a high equity premium now implies a
lower equity premium in the future and hence a higher marginal value of capital (q), i.e. higher
investment in the future.
Most studies ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative effect of uncertainty on investment. However,
Huizinga ﬁnds a positive effect of proﬁt uncertainty on investment, while Goldberg (1993) and
Campa and Goldberg (1995) ﬁnd no effect of exchange rate risk. Bell and Campa report that for
a sample of American and European chemical companies only exchange rate variability
mattered and this only for European ﬁrms.43 Baum et al. ﬁnd that market uncertainty has a
negative effect on investment, but own cash ﬂow uncertainty has a positive effect.
The number of empirical studies that explicitly use irreversibility and option value to model
investment decisions is limited. Caballero et al. (1995) apply the model of irreversible lumpy
micro-level investment to aggregate data of the U.S. manufacturing sector. The main conclusions
are that the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to capital costs is much larger than the
short-run elasticity, and centres around -1, and that adjustment at the macro level is asymmetric:
capital surpluses above the desired value can persists for much longer than capital shortages.
Caballero and Engel (1999) generalize the model by including stochastic adjustment costs that
lead to a probability of adjustment of the capital stock instead of a ﬁxed (S;s) adjustment band.
The model empirically outperforms standard accelerator models.
Bloom et al. (2007) applies the lumpy investment model with demand shocks to a panel of
U.K. ﬁrms over the period 197–91. They ﬁnd that the precautionary effects of uncertainty are
large – going from the lower quartile to the upper quartile of the uncertainty distribution
typically halves the ﬁrst year investment response to demand shocks. This implies the
responsiveness of ﬁrms to any given policy stimulus may be much weaker in periods of high
uncertainty, such as after the 1973 oil crisis and September 11, 2001
43 A potential measurement problem is that the paper uses realized volatility.
766.5.3 Trust and Risk
An important topic in the recent ﬁnancial crisis was the role and the drying up of the interbank
lending market. Heider et al. (2009) are giving a very comprehensive exposition of this issue. In
short, shocks from the capital market, the onset of the crisis in late summer 2007 and the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holding Inc., ﬁrst, gave rise to an increase in interbanking
spreads and ﬁnally a halt in lending. An impression about the last issue can be obtained from
Figure 6.2 from which we can infer the volume of deposits of the Euro area ﬁnancial sector at
the DNB and the deposit facilities at the ECB.
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Source: ECB’s statistical data warehouse and monthly balance sheet of the DNB.
Especially the deposit facilities at the ECB show a tremendous increase after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers but also an increase in deposits with the DNB can be identiﬁed. Heider et al.
(2009), and the literature referred therein, see the reason for this in an increase in asymmetric
information among banks. The participants in the interbank market simply did not know about
the true counter party risk in lending and were stopping operations in this market. Instead banks
deposited their excess liquidity at national central banks and the ECB. Interpreted in terms of
trust, banks did not compensate the asymmetric information by simply trusting borrowing banks,
they distrusted and stopped lending. Stinespring and Kench (2009) present in a pedagogical note
a game theoretical model with one equilibrium being a prisoner’s dilemma with exactly this
property.
77In this context, a recent quote of Jean-Claude Trichet is quite enlightening44
‘It remains for others - national governments, regulators and supervisors, and the private
sector and ﬁnancial industry - to proceed with the difﬁcult, but vital, measures required to
re-establish the trust on which a well-functioning market economy relies.’
He sees the key function of trust as in overcoming market failures that lead to non-functioning
markets. It was not the increased risk in interbank lending, which in principle could be priced,
but the lack of information about the amount of risk in the market that caused the problem. If an
institution as Lehman Brothers can go bankrupt, eventually any bank can do so as well. Trust as
bridging the gap over market failures is also recognized by the scientiﬁc literature. If we look at
a fully competitive economy as assumed in Arrow and Debreu (1954), we do not see any need
for trust; the economy is functioning perfectly efﬁcient without a need of trust. As has been put
perfectly correct by Williamson (1993) who postulates that in a world with full contractibility
and information, there is neither room nor need for something like trust. It is the assumption of
complete and enforceable contracts as well as full information that renders trust unnecessary.
However, in reality contracts are hardly complete nor can contracts be written over all possible
goods; information is by far not perfect. Karlan (2005) therefore gives the very good explanation
that the main role for trust in economics is to overcome market imperfections. Since market
imperfections are so frequent, trust is so important. Indeed, all the preceding chapters of this
document share a common feature. Problems arise within the ﬁnancial system and affect the real
economy due to market imperfections. A statement that seems to be quite applicable can be
found in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002):
‘When people trust each other transaction costs in economic activities are reduced, large
organizations function better, governments are more efﬁcient, ﬁnancial development is
faster: more trust may spur economic success’.
We conclude this paragraph by noting that trust needs to return into markets as the one for
interbank lending in order to fully overcome the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
6.6 Relation to CPB Analyses
CPB models do not pay much attention to the effects of risk on economic behaviour. In the
SAFFIER model and its precursor, the SAFE model (Kranendonk and Verbruggen, 2006; CPB,
2003), risk enters only implicitly. In the consumption equation the interest rate used in the
present value of future income is adjusted by a constant risk correction. The same type of
correction is applied in the expression for the capital costs of ﬁrms. The Overlapping
44 Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, at the 38th Economic Conference of the Oesterreichische
Nationalbank, Vienna, 31 May 2010.
78Generations model GAMMA (Draper et al., 2005) employs a constant exogenous equity
premium to correct for average return differences between stock and bonds.
A number of research projects do explicitly deal with risk. Draper and Westerhout (2009)
study the effects of privatising pensions in an OLG setting with equity risk. Bonenkamp and
Westerhout (2010) use a 2-period OLG model with equity return risk to study intergeneration
risk sharing. Elbourne et al. (2009) present a DSGE model for the Netherlands. However,
households are assumed to behave as certainty-equivalent utility maximisers, so that
precautionary motives are not present.
6.7 Assessment
Financial crises induce a volatility spike in asset returns. The effects of the increase in return risk
are reinforced by a boost in the price of risk. Judged by the effects of standard business cycle
recessions on risk premia, the price of risk about doubles, so that risk premia should far more
than double during a ﬁnancial crisis. In normal business cycles, the peak in risk premia and the
price of risk occurs about eight months after the start of the recession. Volatility reverts to
normal after twelve months, and risk premia are back to normal after about two years. It is
plausible that during (severe) ﬁnancial crises risk premia are boosted more, due to the effect of
Knightian uncertainty, and lags are longer, but empirical information is lacking.
The effect of a hike in income risk on consumers is to boost precautionary saving. Young
households have a buffer stock of a few months salary, and this buffer stock moves
proportionally with income risk. In the US, a severe recession may double income risk, so that
US households may want to save several months of salary in a relatively short time interval.
Households above approximately age ﬁfty are not buffer stock consumers, but life cycle
consumers. The consumption of these households is affected more by movements in remaining
lifetime wealth than in current income. In a ﬁnancial crisis, these households therefore also cut
back their consumption substantially.
Theoretically, the effect of risk on investment is ambiguous, but empirically there is strong
evidence that an increase in return risk lowers investment. Two main reasons may be identiﬁed:
risk-aversion of investors, and an increase in the option value of waiting. The second effect
follows from the fact that investment is to a large extent irreversible: once installed, capital can
only be sold at a loss, especially in recessions. The downside risk is therefore higher than the
upside risk, and ﬁrms prefer to wait and see, even if they are risk-neutral. The initial effect on
investment of a boost in return risk is postponement, but investment also reacts more sluggishly
to changes in business conditions for as long as the high-risk period continues. However, the
long-run effect of uncertainty on the capital stock is again ambiguous.
79807 Conclusion
Credit constraints do limit the activities of borrowers considerably. This issue becomes an
important dynamic component if constraints are determined by pro cyclical collateral values.
During a downturn, this value drops, credit constraints tighten and activity shrinks further. This
is the ﬁnancial accelerator. This mechanism is part of many important economic models
published in excellent scientiﬁc journals. Empirical evidence is in favour of the underlying
theory and institutions as the ECB make use of it when evaluating the impact of their policies.
The theory has been applied to ﬁrms’ investment and households’ consumption. The literature
on the former is, however, better developed and more reliable than the latter. For ﬁrms’
investment, there is a common sense in the literature on how to implement the mechanism in
macro models. In general, it is therefore possible to include it in CPB’s models as well. This
holds both for DSGE models as well as SAFFIER. An alternative to the explicit modelling of the
mechanism would be to take account of this mechanism through an adjustment in course of the
models’ simulations. This could be done through a proper adjustment in the size of shocks that
are used in order to compute the effects of shocks. These adjustments have in turn to be based on
the insights that we gained from the cited literature.
Bank lending is an important determinant of credit supply. It appears that bank balance sheet
composition may affect bank lending activity. This can be due to either a duration mismatch
effect, whereby banks experience a shortage of liquid assets, or to a capitalization effect, where
bank capital falls short of bank liabilities in view of the return risk on bank assets. Monetary
policy primarily affects bank liquidity. Empirical evidence based on changes in monetary policy
shows that changes in bank liquidity do not have a large independent effect on real activity. Most
of the effect of changes in liquidity supply on economic growth run via the associated changes in
interest rates. Bank capitalization has a strong effect on bank lending and bank loan margins. As
economy-wide shocks to bank capital are rare, the empirical evidence of the effects of bank
capitalization on economic activity is mostly based on DSGE models. Results suggest that an
economy-wide shock to bank capital has a substantial and long-lasting negative effect on
economic growth.
International trade and ﬁnance is a hot topic in economics caused by the tremendous effects
of the recent ﬁnancial crisis on world trade. However, trade ﬁnance is complex and comes in
many variants. Most studies assess the impact of ﬁnance from a very broad perspective, heavily
using proxy variables and in a not differentiated way. In addition evidence seems to be mixed;
some authors ﬁnd ﬁnance important while others do not. Given the state of the art, we ﬁnd no
common sense approach that could directly be applied in a macro setting aiming at policy
analysis. Given the importance of trade for the Dutch economy, there is however the need for
further research. This should be done by taking account of available data for the various trade
81ﬁnance instruments for The Netherlands in a pilot study. After an assessment of these data, a
more detailed future research strategy could be developed.
Financial crises boost investment return risk and risk premia. Households and ﬁrms alike
react to an increase in uncertainty by postponing expenditures. This creates a positive feedback
loop that intensiﬁes the downturn. The macroeconomic effects of a ﬁnancial crisis therefore
depend in part on the strength of the precautionary saving motive on the part of households and
ﬁrms, and on the option value of investment on the part of ﬁrms. Existing empirical research
indicates that both types of effects may be substantial.
To integrate these mechanisms in CPB analyses, it would be useful to start a project to
develop measures of return risk and income risk that can be empirically linked to real
expenditures. Relevant measures of risk would be expected volatility of asset returns and
household income, as measured e.g. by stock volatility indices, bond spreads, credit default
swaps, etc. The project should result in empirical estimates of the effect of uncertainty on
investment expenditures and on consumption and saving. A possible spin-off of the project is the
integration of the effects of risk on behaviour in CPB’s macroeconomic analyses.
To sum up, it appears that balance sheet mechanisms such as the ﬁnancial accelerator and the
bank lending channel signiﬁcantly amplify ﬁnancial market shocks and their impact on the real
economy. This seems to be especially true when shocks are large. These mechanisms provide a
dynamic theoretical underpinning for adjustments that take place in the aftermath of a crisis.
This dynamic structure causes the effects to last longer which is very well in accordance with the
empirical ﬁnding that recovery after a ﬁnancial crisis takes longer. While not working over
balance sheets, the risk channel also gives rise to feedback loops that point in the same direction
with respect to the size and the duration of the impact on the real economy. It seems that these
mechanism become extremely important in times of ﬁnancial crises while they are not that
visible during normal times.
828 Appendix A
This appendix provides the stylised model explaining the working mechanism of the ﬁnancial
accelerator and is taken from Bernanke et al. (1996). The model uses due to reasons of
simpliﬁcation the assumption of a hard credit constraint where the borrower is able to borrow
only up to the value of its collateral asset and not beyond.
The model is a two period model, t = 0;1. An entrepreneur has to ﬁnance variable
production inputs x1 in period 0 in order to produce output in period 1. An additional input to
production is a ﬁxed factor K with end of period value qt which is owned by the entrepreneur.
The entrepreneurs debt beginning of period is bt and the gross interest rate is denoted by rt.
Production takes place according to
yt = at f(xt); (8.1)
where at is a productivity parameter and f() is the production function.
The entrepreneur has to ﬁnance purchase of x1 which is in units of output and its price is
normalized to one. Therefore
x1 = a0 f(x0)+b1 r0b0 (8.2)
which is just a book keeping identity.
If there were no credit constraint, the entrepreneur is simply faced with an unconstrained
optimization problem with the solution
a1f 0(x
1) = r1; (8.3)
where f 0(z) =
¶ f(z)
¶z which is a standard ﬁrst order marginal product condition. However, in case
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with equality if the credit constraint binds exactly and the production function is well behaved. If
now x
1 > xc
1, which is true whenever the constraint binds, the marginal product at xc
1 is naturally
higher than at x
1 due to decreasing marginal returns. Thus, the constraint drives a wedge
between the marginal product of x1 inside the entrepreneur’s ﬁrm and the market interest rate r1.
(8.5) also reveals that a decrease of the collateral value q1 automatically reduces xc
1 and with this
also economic activity a1 f(xc
1).
Although this is the most simple model containing a ﬁnancial accelerator, it still does not
allow for a closed form solution that allows us to show the dynamic amplifying mechanism.
83However, we can show them at least partially by linearizing the model. Consider the immediate
impact in a decrease in the collateral value q1 of the amount dq1. Using (8.5) we can easily
obtain the induced change in xc






and the induced change in production as
d f(xc







We see immediately that the spread between f 0(xc
1) and r1 ampliﬁes the effect. This highlights
the importance of the credit constraint. First, it gives rise to a real economy effect via (8.6) and
then ampliﬁes is via (8.7). However, in reality the effects proceed to materialize in the more
distant future which can not be inferred in this model since it covers just 2 periods.
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